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John Adfield Capt. R. A.
from the Author.
October 1826

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PRECIS
OF
THE WARS IN CANADA,
FROM 1755
TO THE TREATY OF GHENT
IN 1814.

WITH
MILITARY AND POLITICAL REFLECTIONS.

BY
MAJ.-GEN. SIR JAMES CARMICHAEL SMYTH, BART.
C.B. K.M.T. K.S.W.

The study of history and the knowledge of past events afford the best instructions
for the regulation and conduct of human affairs.—POLYBIUS.

LONDON.—1826.

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TO
HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
MASTER GENERAL OF HIS MAJESTY'S ORDNANCE,
K.G. G.C.B. & G.C.H.
&c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

IN my anxious endeavours to execute to the best of my abilities, the important commission in His Majesty's North American Provinces, which your Grace was pleased, last year, to do me the high honour of entrusting to my care, it became a very necessary and very interesting part of my duty to make myself acquainted with the details of the several campaigns, and the objects of

the different movements which had formerly taken place, both in attacking and defending the Canadas. The following pages are the result of my reading and reflections upon the subject, aided by the local information I acquired in visiting the country. I venture, with the utmost deference, to lay them before your Grace. The events of these wars afford, in my opinion, a demonstration as clear as that of any proposition in Euclid, of the impossibility (under Divine Providence) of these Provinces ever being wrested from under His Majesty's authority by the government of the United States, provided we avail ourselves of the military precautions in our power to adopt, by establishing those communications and occupying those points, which, posterity will one day learn with, if possible, increased respect for your Grace's great name, were principally suggested by your Grace. It will ever be to me a subject of proud recollection that I should have been selected by your

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Grace to contribute my humble efforts towards the completion of a plan, the outlines of which had been already traced by your Grace's own hand.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

with the utmost respect,

Your Grace's

most obedient, most obliged,

and most faithful humble servant,

JAMES CARMICHAEL SMYTH.

NUTWOOD, REIGATE,

15th August, 1826.

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N.B. *Purdy's MAP OF CABOTIA, published by Laurie in Fleet Street, will be found the most useful Map to refer to in reading the following pages ; showing at one view the relative situation of his Majesty's North American Provinces with each other, and with the territory of the United States.*

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PRECIS
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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

IN the year 1534, in the reign of Francis I., and under the patronage of that monarch, Jacques Cartier, an intelligent and enterprizing French mariner, sailed from St. Maloes, and ascended the St. Lawrence as high as Montreal. He wintered at the Three Rivers, and returned to France in 1535. It was not, however, before the year 1608, a period of seventy-four years after the voyage of Jacques Cartier, that the French government took any steps towards forming a settlement in Canada. French vessels from the ports of Normandy, Brittany, and from all those harbours generally which are to be found on the French part of the coast of the Bay of Biscay, had, in the meanwhile, been employed by indivi-

duals, in fishing on the North American coasts and banks; and in trafficking not only with those natives who were to be met with on the shores of the St. Lawrence, but also with those of Nova Scotia and the Islands of Prince Edward, Cape Breton, and Newfoundland. In the year 1608, Henry IV., by the advice and at the recommendation of the great Sully, sent Samuel de Champlain, at the head of the first settlers ever forwarded from France to Canada, with instructions to establish them at Quebec. The assassination of Henry IV., which took place only two years afterwards, followed by the short and stormy reign of Lewis XIII.; by the disturbances of La Fronde, during the minority of Lewis XIV., and by the four wars which occupied the whole of his reign, after he was old enough to wield the sceptre himself, prevented the successive French ministers from bestowing that attention, or contributing that assistance towards their North American colonies, which, doubtless, would have accelerated their growth. If, however, Canada was not cherished, neither could she be said, during this period, to have been altogether neglected. Grants of lands were made to wealthy individuals upon certain stipulations as to the number of settlers they were to incur the expense of conveying from France to Canada. In 1626 twelve of the principal Seigneurs were raised to the rank of the

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French noblesse; a step which (if of no great consequence in itself) marks nevertheless the interest the French government of that day took in their Transatlantic province. In 1662 (thirty-six years afterwards) Lewis XIV., at the commencement of his reign, notwithstanding his ambitious projects, and the consequent full employment he was likely to have for every French soldier in Europe, yet judged it advisable to send a regiment of the royal troops to Canada to assist the settlers in their wars against the Iroquois. Canada, thus rising by degrees into consequence, attracted the notice (in 1711) of the English government. The new ministry (the same who removed the Duke of Marlborough from the command upon the continent) proposed, in opposition to the policy of their predecessors, to withhold all reinforcement to the army employed in Europe, and to attack France in her colonies. An expedition was accordingly planned against Canada. A corps of five thousand men was sent from England to invade Canada by the St. Lawrence, in co-operation with an attack to be made from Albany, by Lake Champlain, by a body of the New England militia and provincial troops. The fleet from England, either through mismanagement or the very imperfect knowledge the officers must have had of the navigation of the St. Lawrence, lost several ships (both men of war and transports)

and returned to England without any disembarkation having been attempted. The movement from Albany of course did not take place. This hostile attempt was of service to Canada, in so much as the attention of the French government was, in consequence, more steadily given towards the province. The Duke of Orleans, who in his capacity of regent administered the government of France after the death of Lewis XIV., was a prince (however loose and dissolute in his morals and conduct) of an enlarged and comprehensive mind. By his orders the Island of Cape Breton was taken possession of. It was named the Isle Royale; and, according to Raynal, no less a sum than one million two hundred and fifty thousand pounds was expended in fortifying it. This amount appears so very extravagant that one is tempted to doubt the veracity of the author. The remains, however, of the fortifications, and the beautiful drest free-stone now laying about, with which the escarp was faced, sufficiently attest that very considerable expense must have been incurred. It is also to be recollected that the island was, at that period, uninhabited; that the stone was quarried, and the lime burnt in France, and then conveyed, together with the necessary work-people, across the Atlantic:—such value did the French attach to the possession of Cape Breton, and its port of Louisbourg, as the advanced

to a considerable quantity of this free stone was brought to newfoundland by Col. Bannford. in 1609 for the use of the workers —

post and bulwark of Canala against any attack from Europe.

During the thirty-one years of peace, (which continued between England and France from the termination of the war of the Spanish Succession, by the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, until the commencement in 1744 of that relative to the Austrian dominions,) Canada continued to increase in population, and the extent of her commercial intercourse with France to augment as rapidly. The events even of that war were (almost all) only known to the Canadians by report. The sieges of Bergenopzoom and of Maestricht; the battles of Fontenoy and of Lawfeldt contributed to their security, by furnishing employment for the British army remote from their shores. One military event alone took place during this war, by which the growing prosperity of Canada was partially interrupted. This was the capture of the Island of Cape Breton, by an armament fitted out at Boston under the orders of a New England gentleman of the name of Peperell. Peperell, although not a regular soldier, appears to have possessed all the knowledge, talents, and spirit of enterprize, necessary to ensure success to such an undertaking. A squadron of men of war from England co-operated with Peperell; and Louisbourg was surrendered on the 17th June, 1745. It was, however, restored to France at the

peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which took place in 1748, having been in the military possession of the British for about three years.

Canada was now not only about to become the scene of important warfare, but her connection with France was, in consequence, to be dissolved, and her increasing maritime means and resources were destined to be added to those of Great Britain. The Seven Years War, as it is generally called, and which commenced in 1755, might with more justice and attention to historical truth be called the North American War, as it owed its origin entirely to the disputes between England and France as to the limits of their respective colonies in North America.

Baffled in America, France carried the war into Germany, and invaded Hanover, owing to its connection with England. The war was, however, strictly speaking, an American war; undertaken for the protection of our North American colonies; and ending by the expulsion of the French from Canada. The campaigns in Germany and the battle of Minden were but parts of the underplot of the drama. The American campaigns were those, in this war, which principally concerned Great Britain. This war commenced in 1755. It was concluded by the peace of Paris, in February, 1763. During the four first years, the British were unsuccessful, having failed in

their attacks upon the Island of Cape Breton, and upon the French post at Ticonderoga, on Lake Champlain; and having had one corps completely baffled and defeated, (that of Braddock,) on its march from Virginia, to attack the French fort of Duquesne, on the Ohio. Cape Breton, Quebec and Montreal fell, however, in succession, in the three last campaigns of the war; which events gave to the British arms the military possession of Canada, the sovereignty over which province was finally ceded at the peace to Great Britain.

Canada has continued to flourish as a British province ever since the year 1763. During our ever-to-be-lamented contest with our colonies, a very spirited attempt was made by the American Congress, in 1775, to wrest this colony from Great Britain; an attack was made by Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence; in co-operation with which a corps from New England advanced by sea to the mouth of the Kennebec, and penetrated from thence to Quebec by the Kennebec and Chaudiere Rivers. The operation ultimately failed; but the perseverance and spirit of enterprize shown by those who made the attempt must be admired. Two years afterwards (in 1777) the resources of Canada were employed in forwarding a British army (that of General Burgoyne) from Canada towards the Hudson's River. The unfortunate convention of Saratoga is but too well known.

From the peace of Versailles in 1783, until the year 1812, (a period of twenty-nine years,) the Canadians enjoyed uninterrupted tranquillity, notwithstanding the wars and convulsions by which almost the whole of the habitable world was agitated, in consequence of the French Revolution. It is remarkable not only that, during this eventful period, France never attempted to repossess herself of Canada, but that no endeavours were made, by the many champions of Jacobinism, to spread their revolutionary doctrines amongst a people with whom, from a similarity of language, such an undertaking would appear to have offered great facility.

In 1812, the government of the United States declared war to Great Britain. Every arrangement had been previously made for the conquest of Canada; and as the British army was fully employed in a tremendous struggle in Europe, there appeared little prospect of any reinforcements being spared for the defence of a distant province. The events of the war baffled, however, the American calculations. The peace of Ghent (signed at the close of the year 1814) left things in the same state they were previously to the commencement of hostilities.

From this cursory view of the history of Canada, it appears that the transactions of three wars are to be considered by those who would acquire a

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thorough knowledge of her frontier, be enabled to judge of the probable lines of the enemy's operations, and arrive at a clear and well grounded opinion as to the points which ought to be occupied for the defence of his Majesty's North American provinces. The war by which we acquired Canada is the first; the American invasion and General Burgoyne's campaign during the American war appear to be the events of the second which concern Canada. The late war (which was concluded by the peace of Ghent) is the third.

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EVENTS

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THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

1755.

THE French government had turned their attention seriously to their North American provinces ever since the peace of Utrecht in 1713, but with increased activity since that of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, by which, it will be remembered, (as stated in the preceding pages,) the Island of Cape Breton had been restored to France. The topography of North America was but little known to the European cabinets, and the limits of the British and French provinces had, in consequence, been very loosely defined in the treaties of Utrecht and of Aix-la-Chapelle. The French built, in 1750, a small fort, and placed a garrison on the right or southern side of Lake Ontario at Niagara. They also pushed on from Lake Erie by Presqu'île (up the river at present called Frenchman's Creek) to

the Ohio. On the Ohio they constructed a fort called Fort Duquesne, the communication of which with Lake Erie was kept up by two intermediate forts. These encroachments in the rear of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and the prospect of the French settling on the Ohio, (from whence their communications could be easily established by the Mississippi with the province of New Orleans,) caused great alarm in the British colonies. Repeated representations were made to ministers, and commissioners were appointed in consequence, to meet French commissioners at Paris, and to endeavour to come to an amicable arrangement. The French, however, continuing their aggressions, hostilities took place in 1754 between the French detachments and the provincial troops of Virginia. Early in 1755, the British government appointed a commander-in-chief in North America, and sent out with him a body of 2,000 regular troops, with orders to assist the provincial governments; and (in co-operation with the provincial troops) to take possession of the French forts, and to compel the French troops to re-enter what was stated to be the limits of Canada.

The war may be said to have commenced from the date of General Braddock's arrival in America. General Braddock, the commander-in-chief, arrived in America in February, 1755. He assembled

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the provincial governors at Alexandria in Virginia, and the following operations were agreed upon: first, General Braddock himself was to march from Alexandria with 2,000 of the best of his troops to attack Fort Duquesne on the Ohio. Secondly, two regiments were to be detached by the Hudson's River, the Mohawk River, and Lake Oneida to Oswego, (a British post on Lake Ontario,) from whence they were to proceed to attack the new French fort at Niagara. Thirdly, a corps of provincial troops was to be sent to blockade Crown Point, a post on Lake Champlain which the French had occupied in force. And, lastly, the disposable troops (regulars and provincials) from Nova Scotia and Massachussets (about 2,000 men) were to attack the French settlements in the Bay of Fundy, and particularly Fort Beau Sejour situated on the isthmus connecting the peninsula of Nova Scotia with the continent.

The distance from Alexandria in Virginia to Fort Duquesne on the Ohio is about 226 miles. It was the 10th June before General Braddock was able to leave Alexandria, owing to the delays and difficulties of procuring means of transport for his stores and provisions; and it was the 8th July (nearly a month after he commenced his march) before he arrived within ten miles of Fort Duquesne. This delay, arising perhaps princi-

pally from the nature of the country, its uncleared state, and the few resources it afforded at that period, gave time to the French to make every arrangement to receive him. They attacked him suddenly on the 8th July during his march. He appears to have been completely surprized. The British lost General Braddock, twenty officers, and 200 men killed; and twenty-seven officers and about 400 men were wounded. The remaining British troops, after this check, fell back to Philadelphia; where they were embarked and forwarded up the Hudson's River to Albany to assist the detachment ordered, as already explained, against Fort Niagara.

The defeat and discomfiture of the corps under General Braddock could not but have a baneful influence upon the proceedings of the detachments ordered upon the Niagara and Crown Point expeditions. General Shirley, who had charge of that destined for Fort Niagara, (and upon whom the general command devolved after the death of Braddock,) got no farther than Oswego, and returned to winter at New York.

The blockade of Crown Point was entrusted entirely to provincial troops commanded by a provincial general (Johnson). He seems to have taken his measures with great prudence and good sense. He assembled his people at the head of Hudson's River; and, proposing to advance by Lake

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George into Lake Champlain, he threw up some works to cover his stores and provisions at the points both of disembarkation and re-embarkation. The works on the Hudson's River were called Fort Edward; those at the head of Lake George, Fort William Henry. The distance between the two was about twelve miles. The French advanced from Ticonderoga, where they had taken post, (about ten miles in front of Crown Point,) and marched to attack General Johnson's post on the Hudson's River, (Fort Edward,) where he had left a garrison of 300 men. Johnson, getting intelligence of this movement, detached 1,200 men to attack the rear of the French column. The French defeated this party; and, encouraged by their success, assaulted, on the 8th September, General Johnson in his position at Fort William Henry at the head of Lake George. They were, however, repulsed with loss; and the French officer in command, Baron Dieskau, was taken prisoner. The French troops retired to Ticonderoga, having thus failed in their attempts both upon Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. They had been reinforced from Canada, and were more numerous than had been imagined when the expedition against Crown Point had been decided upon. They had 2,000 men at Ticonderoga and 500 at Crown Point. Both these posts they strengthened (after the affair of the 8th Septem-

ber) by every means in their power ; and drawing their supplies from Canada, by Lake Champlain, left respectable garrisons to hold them during the winter.

General Johnson, on his part, exerted himself to place Fort William Henry in a state of defence; and leaving one battalion of Provincials in charge of it and of Fort Edward, he retired to Albany, about fifty miles from Fort William Henry, for the winter. The English post at Fort William Henry and that of the French at Ticonderoga, situated at the two ends of Lake George, were about thirty-five miles distant from each other. Such were the results of the third operation as agreed upon between General Braddock and the governors of the different provinces to be attempted this campaign.

The attack upon the French posts and settlements in the Bay of Fundy, by the governments of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, was the only measure which was completely successful.

Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton, to whom the operation was confided, advanced from Nova Scotia to the low isthmus by which this province is connected with the main land. The shores of this isthmus are bathed on one side by the waters at the head of the Bay of Fundy, on the other by those of Bay Verte, an inlet of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. On the Bay of Fundy side, on very

strong ground, the French had constructed a small fort which they called Fort Beau-Sejour. It had no casemated cover, and was surrendered on the 16th June, after a few shells had been thrown. This work still exists in pretty nearly the same state as when taken from the French; it is now called Fort Cumberland. On the Bay Verte side of the isthmus, at the point where the River Gaspereau runs into the bay, the French had another work. This was merely a redoubt, (the ruins of which still remain,) containing store-houses with articles for the accommodation of the settlers, and for barter with the Indians. It was also taken possession of by Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton. A squadron of three frigates entered the Bay of Fundy at the same time that Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton's detachment advanced against Fort Beau-Sejour. They destroyed a fort the French had constructed at the mouth of the St. John's River, but which they now abandoned without resistance; and by means of their boats, two or three smaller works up the river. These operations deprived the French of every post on the Bay of Fundy, and protected the province of Nova Scotia from all desultory and predatory attacks.

1756.

The British government reinforced the army in America in the spring of this year with two additional battalions, and appointed the Earl of Loudon commander-in-chief. There were now six battalions and eight independent companies of King's troops employed upon this service, independently of the provincial troops and militia. It was proposed to assemble the army at and in front of Albany;—to detach 6,000 men to Oswego, from whence they were to proceed to attack the French at Niagara;—every exertion to be made at Oswego to build a flotilla to assist in the operation against Niagara, and to give to the British the command of Lake Ontario:—the remainder of the disposable force, estimated at about 10,000 men, to advance from Albany to dispossess the French of their posts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain.

The different provinces, in compliance with this arrangement, sent their respective quotas of troops to Albany, where the King's regiments were also directed. It was, however, the latter end of June before a general officer arrived from England to take the command, at which period Major-General Abercromby disembarked at New York. Lord Loudon did not arrive until the end

of July. The French, in the mean while, having received 3,000 additional troops from France, availed themselves of the delay in the British movements to improve their situation to the utmost. They strengthened the works at Crown Point and formed a respectable entrenched camp at Ticonderoga. The fort at Niagara was improved; and great exertions were made to build a flotilla at Frontinac, (now Kingston,) to ensure the command of Lake Ontario, and a consequent easy communication with their posts at Niagara and at Presqu'île, and from thence with their forts on the Ohio. They even determined to anticipate the projected attack upon Niagara by making one themselves upon Oswego.

From Albany to Oswego may be reckoned about a hundred and sixty miles; from Oswego to the French fort at Niagara a hundred and thirty. By means of the Mohawk River, the Oneida Lake, and the Onandago River flowing from the Oneida Lake to Lake Ontario, troops and stores could be forwarded by batteaux and canoes without much difficulty to Oswego. From Oswego to Niagara the navigation was, however, to be attempted upon Lake Ontario, and, of course, a larger description of vessel was required. This made Oswego a place of importance, as the point where the stores and provisions were to be col-

lected, and the flotilla constructed for further operations.

In pursuance of the plan as agreed upon for the campaign of this year, and with a view to the movement against Niagara, General Abercromby forwarded from Albany several convoys of provisions and military stores to Oswego. Fourteen hundred men were allotted for the garrison, and a small work was thrown up for the defence of this important dépôt. The French from Frontinac appeared off Oswego on the 10th August; their flotilla being under the protection of one sixteen and one twelve gun sloop. The Marquis de Montcalm, governor-general of Canada, who commanded the expedition himself, immediately landed his troops, consisting of 3,000 men, at the Anse-aux-Cabannes (a short distance from the English Fort;) and, having established a ten gun battery against it, the garrison surrendered prisoners of war on the 14th August. This was a severe blow to the British interests, as the provisions and stores collected at Oswego were considerable. The loss of the vessels, some of which were nearly completed, consisting of two sixteen gun sloops, two ten gun brigs, and a number of decked boats, was also a very serious evil.

The proposed movement against Ticonderoga

and Crown Point was not attempted. The troops meant to have been employed on this operation were never advanced beyond Fort William Henry at the head of Lake George. Towards the middle of November the provincial troops were sent back to their several provinces. The regular troops remained at Albany, keeping sufficient garrisons at Forts Edward and William Henry.

In considering the causes which led to the want of success in this campaign, it may perhaps be thought that in the original plan too much was contemplated. It would probably have been more advisable to have proceeded against Ticonderoga and Crown Point with the whole of the means which were assembled at Albany, instead of dividing the troops with a view to the Niagara expedition being also undertaken. The French, driven from Lake Champlain, and Montreal threatened, were not likely to have made such exertions to appear in force upon Lake Ontario. It appears also to have been an error to have collected such a quantity of provisions and stores in so exposed a situation as Oswego. If the depôt had been at the west end of the Oneida Lake, or in any favourable situation within a couple of days march of Oswego, it would have been more secure, and could easily have been moved on to Oswego when the troops were about to embark. The delay in forwarding the commander-in-chief

from England doubtless also contributed to the vacillation which seems to have prevailed in the military councils at Albany.

1757.

The British government determined to act entirely upon the defensive, during this year, upon the Canadian frontier, and to send a very considerable armament from England to attack Cape Breton. The execution of this service was entrusted to Lord Loudon, who was ordered to proceed from New York to Halifax with whatever disposable troops he could assemble, after leaving a sufficient force at the head of the Hudson's River as a check upon the French troops at Crown Point and Ticonderoga. At Halifax he was to be joined by the troops and men of war from England destined for the attack upon Cape Breton.

Lord Loudon sailed from Sandy Hook, in furtherance of this service, on the 20th June. His army, when assembled at Halifax, consisted of twelve regular battalions, forming three brigades of infantry, and a detachment of 400 artillerymen. The fleet was composed of sixteen line of battle ships and eight frigates.

This armament was about to sail from Halifax harbour for Cape Breton on the 4th August, when

unquestionable information was received, from a prize vessel taken by one of the British cruisers, of no less than eighteen French line of battle ships and six frigates having arrived at Louisbourg from France; and that the garrison consisted of 3,000 regular troops. Under these circumstances all idea of attacking Cape Breton was given up. The British men of war sailed to cruise off Louisbourg. The troops were divided and placed in garrison at Halifax, at Annapolis, and Cumberland Fort (formerly Fort Beau-Sejour) in the Bay of Fundy. The remainder went with Lord Loudon to New York; from whence they were forwarded to Albany.

Previous to Lord Loudon's sailing to New York, on the expedition against Cape Breton, he had left sufficient garrisons, with every thing required for their defence, both at Forts Edward and William Henry. He had also placed a small corps of about 2,000 men, composed partly of regulars and partly of provincials, (under a supposed intelligent officer,) with instructions to watch the French at Ticonderoga, and to move to the assistance of either of those posts if attacked by the enemy. Notwithstanding these precautions, the Marquis of Montcalm availed himself of the absence of Lord Loudon and the majority of his troops, and invested Fort William Henry. It was very gallantly defended, but was

surrendered by capitulation on the 9th August. On the return of Lord Loudon and the troops, which took place on the 23d August, from the Cape Breton expedition, to Albany, the French evacuated this post, having previously destroyed the works, and retired to Crown Point and Ticonderoga.

1758.

Great exertions were made by the English ministers to obtain more decided results in the campaign of this year than had hitherto been experienced since the commencement of the war. The loss of Oswego, and the cautious conduct of Lord Loudon in the summer of 1756, in abstaining from making some attempt upon Ticonderoga and Crown Point, had rendered him unpopular with the government. He was now blamed, if not for the loss of Fort William Henry during his absence, yet for not having made some forward movement upon his return to Albany. He had had a considerable numerical superiority over the enemy, and the whole of the two best months of the year for military operations in America (September and October) before him. Nothing, however, was attempted. He was in consequence removed, and Major-General Abercromby was appointed to the command.

The operations proposed for this year were the capture of Cape Breton by an armament from England; the French to be dislodged from Ticonderoga and Crown Point by the army assembled in the neighbourhood of Albany under Major-General Abercromby; and the expedition projected against Fort Duquesne on the Ohio the first year of the war, and attempted by General Braddock, to be again resumed.

Of these three objects the attack upon Cape Breton was unquestionably the most important. Cape Breton, in possession of the English, afforded a station from whence Canada could be blockaded; and almost all communication with France intercepted. If the line of operations by Lake Champlain had even been to have been persevered in alone, the capture of Cape Breton (by preventing all succours and reinforcements from France) would, in so much, materially have assisted and facilitated General Abercromby's advance. But it moreover opened, in addition, a new approach towards Quebec, and one peculiarly suited to a great maritime power; affording the means of conveyance, not only for troops, but every requisite article of provisions and stores, to the point where they would be required. The great obstacle to a rapid advance from Albany was the want of transport for stores and provisions. The

capture of Cape Breton, and the consequent line of the St. Lawrence free for our operations, removed all these difficulties.

The armament destined for the attack of Cape Breton sailed from England on the 19th of February, and rendezvoused at Halifax in Nova Scotia. The army, which was commanded by General Amherst, consisted of three brigades, and amounted to about 11,000 men. The fleet was composed of twenty-two line of battle ships and fifteen frigates, and was under the orders of Admiral Boscawen. They left Halifax on the 28th May, and anchored in Gabarus Bay in Cape Breton on the 2d June. Bad weather prevented any disposition being made to land before the 8th June, which was unfortunate, as it afforded the enemy time to make every arrangement for disputing the disembarkation.

The Port of Louisbourg is a magnificent harbour, the entrance into which, between Goat Island and Light-house Point, is not more than 850 yards wide. The French had batteries on both these points. The town, which was on a tongue of land to the westward or left of the entrance, had heavy batteries towards the sea for the protection of the harbour; and was defended by three fronts of fortification towards the land. The French had 3,000 troops in the place; and

the crews of five men of war in the harbour (amounting to 2,500 men in addition) were also disposable to assist in the defence.

Gabarus Bay, where the British ships anchored, is an open roadstead to the westward of the port. The first landing was made at Fresh Water Cove in Gabarus Bay, (by General Wolfe with his brigade,) at about four miles from the town of Louisbourg. There were great difficulties in landing the troops, the stores for the siege, and in keeping up the necessary communication with the fleet. More than a hundred boats, with the greatest part of their crews, were lost in the performance of these services.

As soon as General Amherst had the whole of his troops on shore, he sent General Wolfe round the harbour to dislodge the French from Light-house Point, and to incommode and distress the enemy by throwing in a reverse fire upon the town and those fronts of fortifications against which he carried on his own approaches. Three out of the five men of war in the harbour were burnt by the British fire during the siege. As soon as the access to the harbour was in some degree open, (by the British troops being in possession of Light-house Point,) the Admiral sent in 600 seamen in boats at night, who burnt one and brought out another of the French ships. The place surrendered by capitulation on the 26th

July. Prince Edward's Island (called Isle St. Jean by the French) was included in the articles of agreement. The islands, both of Cape Breton and of Prince Edward, have ever since been held by the British.

Whilst these operations had been carrying on against Cape Breton, General Abercromby had put his corps in movement for the projected attack upon Ticonderoga. He had 6,300 of the King's troops and 9,000 of the provincials under his command ; making a total of rather more than 15,000 men. He embarked this army on the 5th July upon Lake George, (from the spot where Fort William Henry had been constructed,) in 1,035 boats. He disembarked the next morning, soon after daylight, at a place called the Narrows, near some saw-mills. His advanced guard dislodged the enemy's piquets from this position, about two miles from Ticonderoga, which he now determined to endeavour to carry by assault.

Ticonderoga is a point of land at the junction of the waters of Lake George with the river which forms Lake Champlain. It is on three sides defended by water. Across the peninsula the French had thrown up a line of entrenchment with a strong abbatis in front. A small square-bastioned fort at the extreme point formed a keep to the position. The British regulars, about mid-day on the 8th July, advanced to the assault in

six columns, preceded by their light troops and skirmishers. The columns got entangled. The entrenchments do not appear to have been sufficiently or accurately reconnoitred. They formed a belly towards the country; but neither flank had any point d'appui. The troops were led direct to the projecting part of the works. There seems to have been no false attack, or any attempt to turn the position. The French had five battalions, making in all about 3,000 men, at Ticonderoga. In this unfortunate attempt the British had 1,907 men killed and wounded. General Abercromby, after his failure, retreated to the head of Lake George; and entrenched himself on the spot where Fort William Henry formerly stood.

From Fort William Henry, General Abercromby detached a very active officer (Colonel Bradstreet) with about 3,000 troops, almost all provincials, upon an expedition (which this officer had planned) against the French post at Frontinac, (Kingston,) on the north side of Lake Ontario. This little corps went by the Mohawk River and the Oneida Lake to Oswego; where, having procured a sufficiency of boats and canoes, they embarked and landed on the opposite side, on the 25th August. On the 27th the Fort at Frontinac, which was a large square redoubt, of about an hundred yards each front, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty French troops, was surrendered

to them; as also nine vessels, carrying from eight to eighteen guns each. Two of the best of the vessels were laden with the captured stores and provisions, and taken to Oswego. Every thing else was destroyed. This appears to have been a very well concerted, and a spirited enterprize.

The news of the failure of the attack upon Ticonderoga having reached General Amherst at Cape Breton, this officer, after having left proper garrisons both at Louisbourg, and at Halifax, proceeded himself, without delay, with five of his most efficient battalions, to join General Abercromby. He left Cape Breton on the 30th August, and arrived at Boston on the 13th September. Instead of continuing his voyage to New York, and proceeding from thence up the Hudson's River to Albany, General Amherst determined to endeavour to proceed by land from Boston to the head of the Hudson's River at once. From Boston to Albany, the distance is only a hundred and sixty-five miles. But in the year 1780, not only there was no known road or practicable military communication through the woods; but it is not clearly ascertained that the country had ever been explored or even attempted to be penetrated. After fourteen days of a most fatiguing march, General Amherst conducted his five battalions to Fort William Henry, and put them, on the 5th October, under the command of General

Abercromby. He himself returned immediately to Halifax.

The third operation proposed for this campaign, it will be remembered, was the capture of Fort Duquesne on the Ohio.

The troops destined for this enterprize were assembled at Philadelphia. They were almost all provincials, and amounted to nearly 7,000 men. The command was given to General Forbes, an officer of talent and experience. This corps left Philadelphia about the end of June. Upon approaching Fort Duquesne, the advanced guard received a check, and lost three hundred men. When, however, the General himself, and the main body of the force entrusted to his charge, came in sight of the fort, the French evacuated it, and retired down the Ohio to their posts on the Mississippi; and on the 25th November General Forbes took possession without any farther trouble. A garrison was left at Fort Duquesne, the name of which was altered to Pittsburg; and which appellation it retains to the present day.

1759.

The British ministry determined to follow up their success, and to profit by the advantages they

had acquired by the capture of Cape Breton in the preceding campaign. It was decided that the army from Albany should advance again against Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and endeavour to penetrate, by Lake Champlain, to the St. Lawrence; that the expedition against Fort Niagara, which, it will be remembered, had been projected in 1755, (upon which occasion the detachment ordered upon this service had not been able to advance farther than Oswego,) should be resumed; that the small forts in the neighbourhood of Fort Duquesne, constructed between that post and Lake Erie, with a view to keep up a communication from Lake Erie to the Ohio, (as explained in the account of the transactions of the year 1755,) should be attacked; and finally, in co-operation and combined with these movements, that a powerful armament should be sent from England, to penetrate by the St. Lawrence, and to make an attempt upon Quebec. It may be remarked, on the subject of the plans as proposed for this year, that the advance by Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence, and the attack upon Quebec by an armament from England, were important objects, and calculated to obtain most beneficial results. It seems to have been an error, with such great operations in view, to have diminished the strength of the corps destined to advance by Lake Champlain; and to have impeded, in some degree, its movements, by causing the

expedition against the Fort at Niagara to be also undertaken. Quebec and Montreal in the power of the British, the petty post at Niagara must have been surrendered when called upon. It had nothing to do with the advance by Lake Champlain, which it in no way could have impeded. The same reasoning appears to apply to the small posts between Fort Duquesne and Lake Erie. As, however, the troops destined to attack these Forts were provincials from those states most interested in removing the French from that neighbourhood; and as they assembled at Fort Duquesne, and were not taken from the army at the head of Lake George, (previous to its advance upon Lake Champlain,) the causing of these posts to be also attacked, (although not furthering the main objects,) does not appear to have been equally objectionable as the expedition against Niagara. Major-General Amherst was appointed to the chief command in America, in the room of Major-General Abercromby, who was removed as soon as the news of his failure at Ticonderoga reached England. The army destined to advance by Lake Champlain was under General Amherst's immediate command. General Prideaux was detached for the attack of Niagara. General Stanwix had charge of the operations against the posts near Fort Duquesne. The armament from England for the attack of

Quebec was entrusted to General Wolfe and to Admiral Saunders.

General Amherst assembled his army on the 6th June, at Fort Edward, at the head of the Hudson's River, constructed originally, it will be remembered, by General Johnson when advancing in 1755 towards Crown Point. He left Fort Edward on the 21st June, and encamped the same evening on the banks of Lake George. He was employed till the 21st July in conveying his stores and provisions from Fort Edward to Lake Champlain, and in building and collecting the requisite boats and craft for his further progress. He embarked on the 21st July.

The troops under General Amherst's orders employed upon Lake Champlain amounted to 11,000 men. They were composed of six regiments of King's troops, and nine battalions of provincials. He carried with him fifty-four pieces of ordnance of different calibres.

To oppose the advance of the British, the French had a corps of 3,500 men well provided with artillery; and on the Lake they had four stout vessels carrying guns. Their troops occupied the old lines at Ticonderoga; and the vessels (having under their protection a quantity of batteaux for the movements of their troops) were anchored in the vicinity of that post.

General Amherst disembarked on the 22d July at nearly the same spot where General Aber-

cromby's corps had landed in the preceding year, and advanced and occupied in the same manner the ground at the Saw Mills. The troops lay on their arms that night. Upon reconnoitring the lines the next morning, with a view to an attack, it was found that the French had abandoned them. A garrison of 400 men only was left in the small Fort, which was the keep to the position. The remainder of the troops were withdrawn to Crown Point. The garrison from the Fort embarked on the 26th July, and followed the French corps to Crown Point, having previously set fire to the magazine and charged several mines. A deserter, fortunately, gave intelligence, or the casualties might have been very severe amongst the British troops. General Amherst pursued the French to Crown Point, which was found, upon the arrival of the British troops, to be similarly abandoned. The French had retreated to the Isle-aux-Noix. General Amherst took possession of Crown Point on the 4th August. He remained there until the 11th October, strengthening the works, and employed in building a couple of vessels of sufficient size and force to enable him to cope with those which the French had on the Lake. On the 11th October he endeavoured to proceed towards the Isle-aux-Noix, but was prevented by bad weather and contrary winds. He made another attempt on the 19th, but the winter

having evidently set in, it was judged prudent to relinquish all further idea of proceeding down the Lake with the army in batteaux and canoes. On the 25th October, General Amherst returned to Crown Point, and, having made the best arrangements circumstances would admit, for the accommodation of the troops during the winter, at Crown Point, Fort William Henry, Fort Edward, and at Albany, he left the last mentioned post on the 25th November, and proceeded to New York, where he arrived on the 11th December.

The Niagara expedition, it has been already stated, was entrusted to the care of General Prideaux. On the 20th May General Amherst detached this officer from his army with three battalions of the King's troops, two of New York provincials, and a corps of Indians, for this operation. General Prideaux moved to Oswego, by the Mohawk River and the Oneida Lake, as had been done, on a former occasion, by General Shirley, and latterly by Colonel Bradstreet. At Oswego he left a detachment, under Colonel Haldimand, to secure this point, so highly important to him, as the means of communicating with General Amherst, and the only place to which he could retreat, in case of a reverse, or by which reinforcements or stores could be forwarded to him. Having collected craft and batteaux, he embarked at Oswego, on Lake Ontario, on the 1st

July; and, keeping along the southern shore of the Lake, he disembarked within six miles of the Fort of Niagara, on the evening of the 4th, having rowed about a hundred and twenty miles. He caused the fort immediately to be invested. General Prideaux was unfortunately himself killed, on the 19th July, by the accidental explosion of one of his own shells. The command devolved on Sir William Johnson, the same officer who had conducted the operations at the head of Lake Champlain in 1755 with so much vigour and good sense. He continued to press the siege of the fort: the French collected the garrisons of the three small Forts of Presqu'isle, Venango, and Le Bœuf, (already alluded to as keeping up the communication between Lake Erie and Fort Duquesne,) and added such troops as could be spared from their post at Detroit (between Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie.) A body of Indians was joined to this little army, and the whole advanced on the 24th July to the relief of Fort Niagara. Sir William Johnson, leaving a detachment in his batteries, moved forward to meet the enemy. He drove back the French Indians, with the body of Indians attached to his corps; and, having pushed his allies forward so as to turn the left flank of the French line, he caused his regular troops to advance to the attack, and gained a very de-

cided victory. Fort Niagara surrendered the next day by capitulation. The garrison consisted of 600 men. During the attack upon Fort Niagara, a party, consisting of 1,600 French and Canadian troops, crossed Lake Ontario from Frontinac, (Kingston) and endeavoured to surprize Colonel Haldimand at Oswego. They were, however, repulsed, and retreated across the Lake, having suffered some loss.

The third operation as proposed for the campaign of this year, (namely, a successful attack upon the forts between Lake Erie and Fort Duquesne,) was very easily accomplished, owing to the French having withdrawn the greater part of the garrisons with a view to form the corps meant to relieve Fort Niagara. They were all surrendered to detachments from the corps placed, as already explained, under General Stanwix for this operation.

The armament from England destined to advance up the St. Lawrence and to attack Quebec was entrusted to General Wolfe and to Admiral Saunders. It left England so early as in the middle of February, for Cape Breton. On its arrival, on the 21st of April, off Louisbourg, the harbour was found still so inaccessible from ice, that the admiral was obliged to bear away for Halifax. From Halifax, as soon as Louisbourg was open,

the armament proceeded to that port; and, on the 6th June, the whole fleet entered the St. Lawrence and commenced its progress towards Quebec.

The naval force upon this expedition consisted of twenty-two line of battle ships and twenty-one frigates. The troops consisted of ten battalions formed into three brigades: including a detachment of the artillery, they amounted to about 8,000 men.

The French general (the Marquis de Montcalm) had, very properly, contented himself with merely watching Lake Champlain, to which part of his frontier he had allotted a very small corps, 3,500 men, (as would be observed in the preceding account of General Amherst's operations in this campaign,) and had concentrated his means for the defence of Quebec. After placing a sufficient garrison in Quebec, he moved himself at the head of the greater part of his disposable force, and, descending the left bank of the St. Lawrence, he established his head-quarters at Beau-Port, having an advanced corps at the Montmorenci River. He entrenched the whole of the shore from Quebec to Montmorenci, a distance of eight miles. Beau-Port was a central point in this position, being about four miles from Quebec, and as many from Montmorenci.

The French had also a garrison at Montreal, and a corps of about 2,000 men was encamped

on the north side of the St. Lawrence, about twenty miles above Quebec, between the Jacques Cartier River and Point-aux-Trembles, to prevent any disembarkation in that neighbourhood, and to take any troops in reverse which might effect a landing between Point-aux-Trembles and Quebec. The force under the Marquis de Montcalm's immediate command consisted of about 10,000 men, one half of whom (five battalions) were regular French troops; the remainder were composed of corps raised in the province. He had also a considerable body of Indians.

The position taken by the French, and the entrenchments they threw up from Quebec to Montmorenci, although very extensive, yet, unquestionably, offered great advantages. They afforded the prospect of compelling the British general to land beyond the Montmorenci river, and of his having, consequently, to force the passage of that river (as also the Beau-Port and the St. Charles Rivers) in his progress towards Quebec. The services of the militia, the peasantry, and the Indians, were also all more available in the defence of these entrenchments than they could have been in the field. On the other hand, it is to be doubted whether the Marquis de Montcalm did not, by this arrangement, scatter his troops too much; and it may be suggested that, if he had confined himself merely to the defence of the

St. Charles, and abandoned Beau-Port and Montmorenci, he would have acted more judiciously. It is conceived that, if he had taken up the line of the St. Charles, and held the right bank by his light infantry and Indians, supported by his regular troops on the high ground in the rear, with their right resting on Quebec, he never could have been forced. From this position he would, moreover, have been à portée to prevent any disembarkation immediately above Quebec, and in closer connexion and communication with the 2,000 men detached towards Jacques Cartier. If the Marquis de Montcalm had occupied the line of the St. Charles, the British army must either have landed at Beau-Port, and afterwards attacked him in a very strong position, with a river in his front; and a walled town on his right, or have proceeded up the St. Lawrence to select some other point above Quebec for their disembarkation. In the event of this latter alternative being adopted, it has been already observed that the neighbourhood of the French army would have prevented any attempt to land very close to Quebec. Had the disembarkation been effected at Jacques Cartier, or Point-aux-Trembles, the country from thence to Quebec does not offer such decided features, or any such very favourable position as the line of the St. Charles, for the French to have availed themselves of. It is, however, gene-

rally speaking, advantageous for defence. At any rate the Marquis de Montcalm, even on this side, would have had his means more concentrated; and, as the farther from Quebec the British could have been compelled to land, the longer must their line of operations have been, the greater their fatigue in bringing up the stores and provisions, and the necessity of skirmishing with the Indians and Canadians more frequent, in so much the French must have gained by any measure which caused the disembarkation to be made at a distance from Quebec.

Quebec is situated at two hundred and thirty miles from the mouth of the St. Lawrence, at its confluence with the St. Charles. The St. Lawrence, opposite to Quebec, is only a thousand yards broad; but the river just below Quebec forms a noble reach (called the Basin) two miles in breadth, by four in length, terminated and protected to the eastward, or that end lowest down the river, by the Island of Orleans. The British armament anchored in this basin on the 26th June. General Wolfe landed one brigade at Point Levi opposite to Quebec, from whence he cannonaded the defences of the town. He caused the other two brigades to be disembarked to the left or eastward of the Montmorenci River, on the left flank of the entrenchments which, it will be remembered, the Marquis de Montcalm had thrown

up from Quebec to Montmorenci. The Montmorenci River was, however, to be passed before the French could be attacked, or any advance made towards Quebec. Under the protection of the fire from the two armed transports and a fifty gun ship, the brigade from Point Levi was attempted to be landed upon the beach, about three quarters of a mile to the right or westward of the Montmorenci River. The hour chosen for this operation was that of extreme low tide, in order that the two brigades (already on shore to the left of the Montmorenci River) might be able to ford the river at its mouth, and co-operate in the movement, by getting upon the left flank of the French troops employed to oppose the disembarkation of the brigade from Point Levi. The low tide, which was favourable for this latter part of the operation, (namely, the fording of the river,) was, however, detrimental to the first, or the disembarkation and the attack in front. The boats conveying the troops grounded upon a ledge of shelving rocks nearly half a mile from the shore. The men had to get out of the boats and to scramble over the rocks, with occasional deep water, under the fire of the enemy. Great confusion took place: the British lost five hundred men. The landing was, however, effected.

The two brigades ordered to ford the river advanced, and marched through the river, without

any casualty. In consequence, however, of the loss sustained at the attack in front, they were ordered to return to their camp, on the left of the Montmorenci. They were even hurried back on account of the rising of the tide, which would have rendered their retreat impossible.

The arrangements for this attack at Montmorenci cannot be said to reflect much credit on those concerned in directing them. The operation itself would appear to have been injudicious; in so much as, even if successful, the Beau-Port and St. Charles Rivers were still to have been passed. It was defective, however, in its details; as surely the circumstances of the 'rocks being exposed at low water, and the consequent difficulty of landing troops, ought to have been previously known. The front attack (considering the helpless state of troops in boats) ought, unquestionably, not to have been made, until the brigades ordered to pass the river had got upon the enemy's flank and occupied his attention. This movement might have been equally assisted by the fire from the armed transports and the fifty-gun ship, (as was the case,) without unnecessarily exposing the troops. It may be also observed, with respect to this unfortunate business, that, after all, there seems to have been no occasion for a precipitate retreat, or for abandoning the enterprize, provided there had been good and sufficient grounds for undertaking

it. The troops from Point Levi had made good their landing, notwithstanding their casualties. The brigades which passed the river had not as yet fired a shot, when they were ordered to retire.

After the check at Montmorenci the British troops were withdrawn entirely from the left or north side of the St. Lawrence. It was determined to effect a landing above Quebec. To avoid the risk of casualties in crowded transports, from the cannon of Quebec, the regiments were landed at Point Levi. They marched a few miles up the south, on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, whilst the transports and a division of the men of war passed the town and sailed up the river. They were then re-embarked. A small cove about a mile and a half from the town was the point selected for the attempt, which was decided to be made at night. The banks of the River at the cove are 250 feet high, and nearly precipitous. A winding path led from the plain above to the head of the cove, capable of allowing about four men abreast to advance. The country carts do at present go up and down this path, and our modern artillery would think nothing of taking a brigade of nine-pounders (without dismounting the drivers) up the road, as it actually exists. The difficulties of the ascent could not therefore have been so great as has been represented. The enterprize

was sufficiently perilous, and required no uncommon share of firmness and decision to bring to a happy issue, without seeking to surround it by more dangers than actually attended it.

The British army effected their disembarkation at this cove, (now known by the name of Wolfe's Cove,) on the night of the 12th of September. The first brigade which landed ascended the height, repulsed a French piquet, and took possession of a redoubt, and also of a four-gun battery, which the Marquis de Montcalm had ordered to be constructed for the defence of this landing-place. The remainder of the army soon followed, and General Wolfe formed the whole, on the morning of the 13th, on the Heights of Abraham, at about three-quarters of a mile from Quebec, with his right nearly upon the St. Lawrence.

As soon as the Marquis de Montcalm was aware of the disembarkation of the British troops, he hastened from Beau-Port, crossed the St. Charles by a bridge of boats, (which he had previously caused to be made,) and, covered by a crowd of Indian and Canadian sharpshooters, ascended the bank between the valley of the St. Charles and the plains of the Heights of Abraham. He appeared at first to threaten the left as well as the front of the British line, which caused three battalions to be thrown back *en potence*. It was, however, upon the right of the British that the

French made their principal attack. The movement against the British left appears to have been only a feint, the following up of which was entrusted to the light troops and Indians. The French battalions ordered to attack the British right, formed their line in front of their enemy, and advanced with great spirit and regularity. The fire of musketry must have been very severe whilst it lasted, as the British lost 607 men killed and wounded; the French 1,500. The battle may be said to have been fought almost entirely with the musket, as the British had but one, and the French two guns in the field. The French left first gave way. The officer commanding the two centre battalions of their line fell back in consequence, but leisurely, and took up a new position nearer to Quebec, in front of some copse wood; by which movement he (in some measure) covered the retreat of the troops on his left. The French right fled without any attempt at a new formation, and were pursued as far as the bridge of boats, on the St. Charles.

In this action the British lost their commanding general, General Wolfe; and their second in command, General Monckton, was so severely wounded as to be incapable of acting. It is a curious coincidence that the French general, the Marquis de Montcalm, was also killed; and his second in command was likewise badly wounded:

the latter died, indeed, of his wounds in a few days after the battle. The zeal, courage and activity of the Marquis de Montcalm entitle him to every praise. It has already been suggested that his position, however, at Beau-Port was not judicious; and it has been remarked, in a preceding page, that the high ground on the right or southern bank of the St. Charles would have been the preferable situation for the defence of Quebec. Had the French army occupied this ground, the disembarkation at Wolfe's Cove never could have succeeded; the British army would have been liable to have been attacked and beat in detail, before one half of their force could have been landed. Upon the present occasion the Marquis de Montcalm appears to have committed a still greater and more fatal error. A battle was General Wolfe's object, and must, generally, be that of every assailant. To avoid one ought consequently to have been that of the Marquis de Montcalm. His attack upon General Wolfe's corps was gallant, but it was rash and precipitate. It would rather appear that, when he found he could not bring his troops from Beau-Port in time to attack the English before they had completed their disembarkation, it would have been more advantageous to have profited of the near neighbourhood of the works of Quebec, and compelled General Wolfe to attack him behind them. The

defences of Quebec were not so strong as respectable field-works. They were not, however, to be taken by assault, defended by such good troops as were under Montcalm's orders; nor had the English general such a superiority of regular regiments as to have justified his making the attempt. To have established batteries, and to have broke ground, would have been an operation requiring considerable time and labour. The season was slipping away rapidly, and the French had every thing to gain from delay. It is also to be observed that Montcalm had a corps of about 2,000 men in the rear of the British army, which has been mentioned in the preceding pages as being employed to prevent any disembarkation at the mouth of the Jacques Cartier River, or at Point-aux-Trembles. This detachment would have harassed the British army, and impeded their communications had they been obliged to remain before Quebec and to commence regular operations. It may further be remarked, with respect to this corps, that it ought surely to have been called in, and been united to Montcalm's army, before he determined to venture every thing upon the risk of a battle.

The battle was fought on the 13th September, and on the 18th Quebec was taken possession of by capitulation. The garrison consisted only of 1,000 French troops, including their sick and

wounded. Their disposable force had been withdrawn from Quebec after the battle, and (united to the corps already alluded to as stationed in the neighbourhood of the Jacques Cartier River) now occupied the country between the Jacques Cartier River and the Trois Rivières, having advance posts at Point-aux-Trembles, St. Augustin and Calvaine.

Brigadier-General Murray was left in the command at Quebec, with a garrison of 7,000 men. The men of war and transports returned to England soon after the capitulation, with the exception of two twenty-gun ships, which were ordered to remain in the St. Lawrence to controul the navigation.

Thus ended the campaign of 1759; a year which, by the capture of Quebec, will be ever memorable in the British military annals. The British generals had also been fortunate, as already explained, in the three other objects of the campaign; namely, the advance by Lake Champlain; the capture of the fort at Niagara; and the removal of the French from the post they occupied between Lake Erie and the Ohio. The first of these operations had, perhaps, been crippled, (as already suggested,) and was not quite so complete as it otherwise might have been, by being connected with the second. The possession, however, of Ticonderoga and Crown Point offered

such facilities for an advance upon Montreal in the ensuing season, that, upon the whole, the campaign may be said to have been eminently successful.

1760.

After the fall of Quebec it was probable that, unless reinforced from Europe, the French troops in Canada would ultimately be obliged to surrender. They were, however, far from being an enemy to be despised. The regular troops, it is true, did not amount to more than 5,000 men. They were, however, well acquainted with the country, and enured to the climate. The customs, laws, and language were their own. They not only recruited in the province, but had several very good provincial battalions, besides a numerous body of Indian auxiliaries. The British government, therefore, acted very wisely in determining to follow up, this year, with vigour, the successes of the preceding campaign; and in endeavouring to bring the war in Canada to a close. Had a French armament appeared in the St. Lawrence before the conquest of Canada was completed, it would have rendered the subjugation of the province a work of much greater difficulty. The policy of bringing the hostilities in Canada

to a speedy and successful termination was undeniable.

General Amherst (who commanded in chief the troops at Quebec, as well as those under his own more immediate orders, in the neighbourhood of Albany) determined to advance upon Montreal from three different points. He proposed to conduct himself a corps of rather more than 10,000 men, by the Mohawk River and the Oneida Lake, to Oswego; there to embark on Lake Ontario, and to proceed to Montreal by descending the St. Lawrence. He placed a detachment of 3,300 men under the orders of Colonel Haviland, with instructions to advance from Crown Point by Lake Champlain upon Montreal. General Murray was to ascend the St. Lawrence with whatever disposable force he might have, after leaving a proper garrison for the security of Quebec. General Murray was able to move with 2,450 men. Thus, by these arrangements, a force consisting of nearly 16,000 men, it was expected, would be assembled against Montreal.

As General Amherst's operations were successful, hasty observers have taken it for granted they were judicious; and they have (in latter days) even been attempted to be imitated. They will not, however, stand the test of investigation: and the movement by Oswego, Lake Ontario, and the

St. Lawrence may be pronounced to have been imprudent and unnecessary.

The distance from Albany to Oswego is one hundred and sixty miles; from Oswego, across Lake Ontario to the commencement of the St. Lawrence, there are sixty miles of water conveyance; and from the commencement of the St. Lawrence to Montreal a hundred and seventy-four additional miles of a very rapid and dangerous river, making a total distance of three hundred and ninety-four miles for the conveyance of the troops, as well as the provisions, ammunition and stores they required. That part of the St. Lawrence between Ogdensburg and the commencement of Lake St. Francis (a distance of forty-eight miles, which includes the Long Sault) is not to be descended without care and considerable skill. To ascend it is a work of time and severe labour. From Lake St. Francis to Lake St. Louis, a distance of twelve miles, the river is one continued series of rocks and rapids, only to be descended by the native boatmen, who, from constant practice, are acquainted with the very intricate and dangerous passages between the rocks. To take even a birch canoe, the lightest of all possible boats, up this part of the stream, was, in the year 1760, impossible. Every thing was obliged to be taken out, and the boat itself carried by land. Locks have since been made, by means of which

the Canadian batteaux, and even a larger boat, called the Durham boat, (by keeping close to the shore and profiting of the locks and canals constructed at those points where they are absolutely necessary,) can be forwarded from Lake St. Louis up the river to Lake St. Francis. It is, however, to be observed that, even with all this assistance, they are still obliged to be unloaded. From this description it may safely be asserted that such a line of operations, for a corps of any magnitude, was perhaps never before even imagined. General Amherst had no nearer communication with his point of departure than Oswego. His resources, his supplies, his reinforcements, were all to be drawn from thence. It may be asked how was he to communicate with Oswego from Lake St. Francis? One hundred Indians at the Long Sault were sufficient to have prevented the possibility of all intercourse. Had he been checked by the French, and his progress impeded at the rapids between Lake St. Francis and Lake St. Louis, (and which might very easily have been done,) he never could have forced his way forward into Lake St. Louis; and his retreat up the Long Sault and into Lake Ontario, under circumstances of difficulty and serious opposition, must have been morally impossible. Let the state of the country be also remembered; the little resources it affords, even now, to feed an

army without previous arrangement. General Amherst could have had no supplies to depend on but the pork and biscuit he had brought with him in his boats; and as every day's delay would have diminished the quantity, he would have had to encounter (even supposing him to have been resisted by an inferior enemy) very serious difficulties. Had the French opposed with spirit the advance of this corps, the most disastrous consequences must have ensued. An unconditional surrender appears by no means unlikely to have been the probable, if not unavoidable, consequence.

It is not meant by the foregoing observations to insinuate that enterprizes are not to be undertaken in war, and with a great object in view, which, under common circumstances, may appear to be rash. If nothing is risked, nothing can be gained. It is surely, however, not asking too much from any one to whom the honour of the arms of his country is confided, to expect that he shall run into no unnecessary dangers; that he shall well consider the end to be attained, and compare it with the means at his disposal. In the present instance, a very long and dangerous flank movement was made with the principal corps of the army, to accomplish that which was to be effected by a more short, more simple, and more direct line of operations. From Crown Point

to St. John's, Lake Champlain offered every facility for the conveyance of the army destined to attack the French at Montreal. To such a force as General Amherst had with him (assisted by the heavy ordnance which, to any extent, he might have transported by water) Fort St. John could have offered but little resistance. From Fort St. John to the right bank of the St. Lawrence, opposite to Montreal, he would only have had to have marched twenty-four miles. The river was certainly to be passed; but, the French once driven back and confined to the island of Montreal, all the craft in the Richelieu River, from Chambly to Sorel, would have been at his command; and, moreover, he might have expected to have been joined at Sorel by General Murray's corps from Quebec, together with such boats and shipping as they must have brought with him. It appears to amount to a demonstration that General Amherst ought to have advanced with the body of his army by Lake Champlain. The French forts upon Lake Ontario, at Niagara and Frontinac, it will be remembered, had been destroyed; the former in the preceding year, the latter by Colonel Bradstreet in 1758. They had not a single establishment upon the lake, nor in the upper part of the St. Lawrence above Montreal, excepting at a place called La Galette, below the lake of the Thousand Islands, where

they had built two gunbrigs after the destruction of their flotilla at Frontinac. They had also a small fort on an island in the St. Lawrence, called the Isle Royale, between Prescott and Ogdensburg, answering to them the same purpose as Fort Wellington has, of late years, rendered to the British; namely, that of protecting the transhipping the effects destined for the upper parts of the province from the canoes and batteaux to larger vessels more adapted to the navigation of the lake. If the capture or destruction of these miserable posts may be supposed to have had any weight in determining General Amherst to make the movement, (the impropriety of which we are now discussing,) it may be remarked, that a brigade of provincials and a body of auxiliary Indians, under such an active partisan as Colonel Bradstreet, would have been amply sufficient for the accomplishment of these purposes. It would consequently appear, in which ever way we consider the subject, that it would have been far more judicious for General Amherst to have advanced by Lake Champlain towards Montreal at the head of the corps he entrusted to Colonel Haviland, as well as that under his own immediate command. Their united strength would have given him a total of nearly 14,000 British and provincial soldiers.

In furtherance of the plan for the campaign, as

explained, General Amherst conducted his army to Oswego; where he arrived, with the first division, on the 9th of July. Before the end of the month his corps was completely assembled. He had previously caused two decked vessels, each carrying sixteen six-pounders, to be fitted out at Niagara, to convoy his fleet of boats across Lake Ontario, and as far down the St. Lawrence as was navigable for craft of this description. The French had also two sloops on the lake, (each carrying ten twelve-pounders,) built at their station of La Galette, the situation of which has been already explained. The two British vessels, having chased the two belonging to the French into the St. Lawrence, returned to Oswego; and, on the 9th of August, the advanced guard of the army embarked on board of boats, and proceeded (under their convoy) across Lake Ontario. The remainder of the army followed, in two divisions, on the 10th and 11th; and, on the 13th of August, the whole having crossed Lake Ontario, proceeded through that part of the St. Lawrence called the Lake of the Thousand Islands, and reached Point de Barril, a few miles above the spot where Fort Wellington at present stands. The force thus descending the St. Lawrence amounted to rather more than 10,000 men; and was composed of seven battalions of King's troops, seven ditto of provincials, and a detachment of one hundred

and fifty artillery-men. On the 17th of August General Amherst arrived at Osgewetchie (at present called Ogdensburg). On the same day one of the two vessels, belonging to the French, was very gallantly captured by some of the boats of the army. The two British vessels had gone into a wrong channel of the river and were not able to render any assistance at the moment. Isle Royale was now either to be passed or taken. The former would have been dangerous from its situation and the command the guns of the work upon the island had upon the navigable channel. It was therefore invested, on the 20th August, by encamping detachments on each side of the river, and establishing a battery to bear upon it from either bank. An attempt was made to carry it by a coup-de-main on the 23d, but which failed, and with the loss of one of the vessels before alluded to, as having convoyed the boats, with the army, from Oswego; and which now had been employed to carry part of the storming party across the river. The fort capitulated, however, on the 25th.

The army proceeded on the 31st August, and, on the 2d September, anchored at Pointe-aux-Boudets in Lake St. Francis, having passed the Rapids of the Longue Sault without any material accident. The dangerous part of the navigation was, however, yet to be met with. On the 4th

September, the advanced guard left Lake St. Francis, on its way towards Lake St. Louis. No less than sixty-four boats were lost in these Rapids. The greatest confusion and distress prevailed; and, it is evident, that had any opposition been offered, the further progress of General Amherst's corps would have been a very serious undertaking. It would have been as difficult to retreat. Fortunately, however, not a shot was fired, nor a French soldier seen. On the next day the remaining boats of the army were conducted through, by the aid of the inhabitants and boatmen of the country, with due precaution; having been previously lightened and most of the troops removed. General Amherst halted, on the 5th, at the foot of the Cascades Rapids to repair his boats. On the 6th he re-embarked, and, crossing Lake St. Louis, he landed at La Chine above the Rapids of that name. He marched quickly forwards towards Montreal; in front of which he took up his ground the same evening. The next morning negotiations were entered into for the complete surrender of the province; and, on the 8th September, a capitulation to that effect was signed by the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the Governor-General.

A short time before General Amherst's arrival in front of Montreal there were not five hundred French troops on the island; and, consequently,

the Marquis de Vaudreuil had no means to continue the contest until the disposable French force, which had been employed to oppose the progress of the columns advancing by Lake Champlain and up the St. Lawrence, fell back upon him. Further opposition would then have been evidently useless. It appears, however, extraordinary that, as the French had some very good regiments in Canada, and many of their officers were possessed of considerable talents and spirit of enterprize, they had allowed General Amherst to approach Montreal, without opposition, by the route which he did pursue; and it can only be accounted for by supposing that they did not expect that any military man would so commit himself. As it was, they lost an opportunity of retrieving their affairs. If General Amherst's corps had been captured, the strength neither of General Murray's nor Colonel Haviland's columns was such as to have allowed them to persevere in the movement against Montreal, unsupported by General Amherst.

General Amherst, it will be remembered, had entrusted a corps to Colonel Haviland with instructions to advance upon Montreal by Lake Champlain. This corps was composed of three battalions of King's troops, and of three provincials, with a detachment of artillery, and amounted to 3,200 men. Colonel Haviland embarked at

Crown Point, on the 11th August, the troops under his orders, in 410 boats, and proceeded, under convoy of an armed brig, three row galleys, carrying one gun each, and a radeau with six twenty-four pounders, without molestation, as far as the Isle-aux-Noix. He arrived at the Isle-aux-Noix on the 16th. He established three batteries, upon the right or western side of the river, against the fort which the French had on the island. The garrison was withdrawn on the 27th. On Colonel Haviland's further advance Fort St. John was also evacuated. From Fort St. John he put himself in communication with General Murray, who had arrived at the island of Therese just below that of Montreal; and who sent his grenadiers and light infantry to reinforce Colonel Haviland, and to conduct him to Varennes; from whence he passed over to the island of Therese. On the 7th of September the united corps of General Murray and Colonel Haviland landed, from the island of Therese, at the Point-aux-Trembles, at the lower end of the island of Montreal; and, on the 8th, advanced and encamped within two miles of Montreal. The capitulation and surrender of the province was here announced to them; and, of course, put an end to all further movements.

General Murray had left Quebec (in pursuance of his orders to proceed up the St. Lawrence) on the 14th June, with a corps of 2,450 men, em-

barked on board of forty transports and twenty-six large boats, and under the convoy of two frigates, a sloop of war, and nine galleys carrying one gun each. Notwithstanding that a garrison of 7,000 men had been left at Quebec, after its capture, General Murray was not able to bring with him a larger force, owing to the heavy losses he had sustained, both from sickness and from casualties, during the winter. He had been in a state of constant alarm and warfare, having had to guard against an active enemy without, (equal, if not superior, in numbers to his garrison,) and to contain a troublesome population within, not yet reconciled or accustomed to the change of authority. He lost, in consequence, by sickness alone, 1,000 men. He had been obliged to make frequent detachments to drive the French troops out of the villages surrounding Quebec, which they attempted to occupy to prevent his drawing any supplies from the country. He had found it necessary, upon one occasion, in the depth of winter, to cross the St. Lawrence on the ice, and to dislodge a French detachment from Point Levi. In the spring of the present year, as soon as the St. Lawrence was navigable, the Chevalier de Levi (who commanded the French troops in Canada under the authority of the governor, the Marquis de Vaudreuil) had moved, with the greater part of the disposable French force, from

Montreal to endeavour to re-take Quebec. The French landed their troops about thirty miles above Quebec, at Point-aux-Trembles, from whence they advanced by Lorette towards Quebec. General Murray moved out of Quebec on the 28th April, and drew up his troops, amounting to about 3,000 men, and twenty field-pieces, on the Heights of Abraham. The French had halted below him and to his right, near the wood of Sillery. The French soldiers were occupied in cooking and in cleaning their arms. Murray thought he had an opportunity of attacking them to advantage, and descended from the strong ground he had previously occupied. He appears to have acted injudiciously in this respect; more particularly, as by so doing, he deprived himself of the advantage of a numerous artillery, which would have been of the greatest use to him in a defensive position. He lost a thousand men in killed and wounded and the whole of his guns.

This affair gave the greatest confidence to the French, and there appeared every probability of their being able to re-take Quebec. The Chevalier de Levi invested the town closely, and caused three batteries to be established, which opened their fire against the works of Quebec on the 11th May. On the 16th, however, a line-of-battle ship and two frigates arrived from England. The frigates, passing Quebec, made sail to attack

the French ships, above the town, which had brought the French artillery and stores from Montreal. The Chevalier de Levi immediately retired from before Quebec, and retreated to Jacques Cartier, leaving thirty-six heavy guns, six mortars, together with his ammunition, provisions, and camp-equipage, on the ground.

Quebec thus fortunately relieved, on the 16th of May General Murray was able to make the necessary arrangements for carrying into execution the orders he had received; and, as already stated, commenced his movement, by water, up the St. Lawrence, at the head of 2,450 men, on the 14th June.

The French appear to have had still about 8,000 men (Regulars and Provincials) disposable for the defence of the province at the commencement of this campaign. A small Fort at the mouth of the Jacques Cartier; the Island of St. Helen; the town of the Three Rivers; the town of Montreal; the small Fort upon the Isle Royale; the post at Detroit, and Michilimakinak, required nearly a thousand men. There remained 7,000 troops to keep the field. These the Chevalier de Levi had divided into two corps; one, consisting of 3,000 men, was appointed to defend the St. Lawrence, and to oppose the advance of General Murray. The other (the strength of which was, of course, 4,000) had its head-quarters at Sorel,

with a view to watch the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain; at the same time that it was equally well situated for assisting in the defence of the St. Lawrence.

The French had constructed batteries and entrenchments at the mouth of the Jacques Cartier River; at Point Dechambaud, which commands that part of the St. Lawrence called the Richelieu Rapids; at the Three Rivers; and at Sorel. These works were abandoned in succession, (as soon as the leading English ships passed them,) from the apprehension the French troops allotted to their defence had of being cut off from Montreal. At Sorel the French were in force, the corps appointed for the defence of the St. Lawrence having fallen back upon this place; which, it will be remembered, was moreover the head-quarters of that appointed to watch the Richelieu. The officer commanding the latter had withdrawn his garrisons from the Isle-aux-Noix, and from St. John, in consequence of General Murray's advance up the St. Lawrence, which appeared to him the more pressing danger. The British fleet sailed past Sorel without any accident, as the river here is sufficiently wide. The French troops quitted Sorel, and marched up the right bank of the river as high as Bouquerville and Longueil, from whence they passed over to Montreal. General Murray landed a detachment at Sorel, and burnt

the town, in consequence of the inhabitants having wantonly fired on some of his boats. He then proceeded up the river, and anchored, on the 27th August, between Varennes and the island of Therese; and, after having been joined by Colonel Haviland, he passed over to the island of Montreal on the 7th September.

Thus ended the campaign of 1760. Although not so brilliant, to a military man it affords more grounds for reflexion than that of the preceding year. Deprived of all communication with France, and dispirited by the loss of Quebec, it was to be expected that the French troops in Canada would be obliged to capitulate this season. In our arrangements to bring about this important object we appear, however, to have committed an error of such a magnitude as to have offered the enemy a most favourable opportunity of acquiring a superiority. In not profiting of it, the French, it may be asserted, were guilty, equally with ourselves, of an important oversight.

1761.

The French made no attempt this year to disturb the British government in the possession of Canada.

1762.

A squadron, consisting of two line of battle ships and two frigates, sailed from France, with twelve hundred troops on board, to attack the island of Newfoundland. The troops were landed at the Bay of Bulls, to the westward of the town of St. John's, on the 24th June; and the English garrison, which consisted of sixty men in a small fort, surrendered on the 27th.

General Amherst, who was still commander-in-chief in America, immediately detached from New York one wing of the Royals, one ditto of the 45th Regiment, and five hundred provincials, with a company of Artillery, making a total of fifteen hundred men, to endeavour to dislodge the enemy. These troops disembarked at Torbay, about nine miles from St. John's, on the 13th September. The French, having been driven from some high ground which they occupied, and which surrounded the fort, retreated into the work. A gun and a mortar battery were immediately established, and the French surrendered prisoners of war on the 18th September.

Preliminary articles of peace were signed this year on the 3d November, at Fontainebleau.

1763.

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at Paris, on the 10th February. Canada, Cape Breton, Prince Edward's Island, and the French posts in the Bay of Fundy, were to be kept by Great Britain.

W A R
OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
AS FAR AS IT AFFECTED CANADA.

THE conquest of Canada, which had been achieved by the united efforts and combined exertions of the British and Provincial troops, ought, it may be thought, to have been a bond of union between them. It might naturally be supposed, that they would have separated with sentiments of mutual good will and respect, and that, subjects of the same King, and members of the same empire, whilst the Provincial admired the showy discipline, prompt obedience, and chivalrous courage of the regular army ; his patience, his steadiness, his ready aptitude to acquire the essential qualifications of a soldier ; his superior skill with the axe and the spade, and his great facility of hutting and providing for himself in a desert, would have called forth corresponding expressions of

esteem, and caused a general conviction of his utility. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have been the case. The Provincial troops were undervalued. They had had no share in the two most brilliant events of the late war, the capture of Cape Breton and the battle on the Heights of Abraham. The many toilsome marches, (which it may safely be asserted, without their help, could not have been accomplished,) their useful aid and co-operation, upon every other service than the two mentioned, were forgotten. Those officers of the British army, who had been serving upon the continent of Europe, were but too apt to underrate all military corps or establishments not in that state of order upon the parade which they had learned to admire. The King of Prussia (too able a man to be deceived himself) had, through policy, done his utmost to mislead others; and to impress upon the minds of his neighbours, the very superior advantages of the Prussian discipline and tactics. It was an avowed maxim of his, that discipline was every thing, and the mind of the soldier nothing; whereas, the experience of all ages has shown, that (of the two) the converse of the proposition is rather the most correct. Discipline and previous instruction are by no means to be neglected. But the page of history is full of the heroic exploits of men, who, being animated with zeal for the cause which induced

them to fly to arms, soon acquired sufficient knowledge to enable them to contend with the best disciplined troops. It is an acute and just observation of Hume's, that "though the military profession requires great genius and long experience in the commanders, all its subordinate duties may be discharged by ordinary talents and from superficial practice." These reflections occur in considering the causes which led to the ever-to-be-lamented war which Great Britain had now, unfortunately, to wage against her American colonies. The British government had, most unwisely, had it in contemplation, ever since the peace of Paris in 1763, to endeavour to raise a direct revenue in America. It may, however, very safely be asserted, that this scheme never would have been attempted to have been enforced, had a more correct and liberal opinion been formed of the value of the Provincial troops, and of the means of resistance in possession of the American colonists. Lord Chatham, indeed, did raise his prophetic and warning voice. "You talk of conquering America, of your powerful forces to disperse her army. I might as well talk of driving them before me with this crutch." These were almost the last words of this great man in the House of Lords. They were, however, unregarded, under the angry and impatient feelings which unfortunately prevailed at the time.

In pursuance of the plan for drawing a direct revenue from America, as already explained, an act of parliament was passed, in the spring of 1765, authorizing a stamp duty. In consequence of the strong ferment which this measure created, it was revoked in 1766. In 1767, however, another bill was brought in and passed, directing a duty to be collected upon all tea, glass, paint, and some other articles, imported into the American ports. In 1770, this act was also repealed, with the exception of the duty upon tea. As the Americans purchased their tea from Dutch smugglers, the act authorizing the duty upon tea was, in fact, nugatory, and therefore created no very great sensation in America until in 1773. The British government, in that year, with a view of being able to collect the duty, permitted the East India Company to send ships laden with tea to America. The inhabitants of Boston threw the tea in the river, and compelled the ships to leave their harbour. In 1774, the British government, in consequence, shut up the Port of Boston, repealed the charter of the State of Massachusetts, and sent a body of troops to Boston, under General Gage, to enforce obedience. The other colonies took the part of the people of Boston, and deputies from each province were sent to Philadelphia, where they assembled in Congress, for the first time, on the 5th December, 1774. It was

evident that a civil war was fast approaching. If the British government determined to persevere in their attempt to raise a direct revenue in America, it could only be done by the bayonet.

1775.

June The war may be said to have commenced on the 6th July, in this year, on which day the American Congress published a declaration of the motives and reasons which induced them to have recourse to arms. The few British troops in America were concentrated at Boston. The Americans (with a view to invest Boston and to cut off all communication between that place and the country) occupied some commanding ground in the neighbourhood, called Bunker's Hill. On the 17th July, they were attacked and dislodged. This affair cost the King's troops a considerable number of officers and men, and was unfortunately productive of no corresponding advantages. The Americans still continued to surround Boston, although not quite so close to the town; and as their numbers every day increased, it was not judged prudent, until reinforcements arrived from Europe, for the garrison to make any further attempt upon them.

The American Congress determined to avail

themselves of this favourable posture of their affairs, to carry the war into Canada, and to endeavour to get possession of Quebec. An hostile feeling had long prevailed between the French Canadians and the Americans. The Americans dreaded that these sentiments should, under the direction of the British government, be made available, in the present contest, to their detriment. The gigantic views of France with respect to Canada have already been explained in the detail of the causes of the origin of the Seven Years War. Great Britain had made considerable exertions, and with the aid (and unquestionably most useful aid) of the provincial troops, and the assistance of the provincial resources, the French government had been compelled to withdraw from the continent of America. It now became a very serious question to the Americans, how far Great Britain might enter into the former French plans with respect to Canada. It was, consequently, wise and politic in them (having determined to separate from the mother-country) to shut out, if possible, British power and influence from Canada. In guarding against an immediate evil, they were also defending themselves from the possibility of a remote one.

The Americans proposed to push one corps, by Lake Champlain, upon Montreal, whilst another was to be detached from their army in front of


Boston, by sea, to the mouth of the Kennebec River, to cross the high ridge between New England and Canada, and to descend to the St. Lawrence by the Chaudiere River, which runs into the former, nearly opposite to Quebec.

The British government had only one weak battalion in Canada. If the American expedition was consequently conducted with spirit and secrecy, (so as to allow no time for the calling out and organizing the Canadian militia,) the column destined to advance upon Montreal had every prospect of success. The corps ordered to move by the Kennebec River had to encounter difficulties of no common kind, and perhaps only to be overcome by men not only accustomed to the deprivations and wants of an early American settler, and habituated to find in themselves those resources which such a habit of life calls forth, but under the influence, moreover, at the time, of the strongest enthusiasm.

The American troops meant to be employed against Montreal amounted to 3,000 men. They assembled at Crown Point, the possession of which had been previously acquired. They pushed on to Isle-aux-Noix, which was evacuated at their approach. Five hundred British regulars, (almost all the force in Canada,) assisted by two hundred Canadian militia, occupied Fort St. John, with a detachment at Chambly. General Montgomery,

who commanded the Americans, caused both these places to be invested at the same time. The post at Chambly was immediately surrendered; it could hardly, indeed, be called defensible:—a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition had, however, very improvidently been placed within it. These fell into the hands of the Americans and assisted them in their operations against Fort St. John.

Sir Guy Carleton, the governor of Canada, caused Sorel to be occupied by some Canadian militia and a battalion he had raised in a hurry from amongst the Highlanders who had lately emigrated to Canada. Whilst he thus endeavoured to prevent the approach of the Americans towards Quebec by the Chambly River and the St. Lawrence, (which line of operation was open to them after the fall of Chambly,) he proposed, with another corps of Canadian militia, to move towards Fort St. John, and to compel the enemy to raise the siege. He was, however, foiled in his attempt to pass over the St. Lawrence from Montreal to La Prairie, by the Americans having occupied the latter. The militia and the new troops he had stationed at Sorel, hearing of this check, dispersed. The garrison of Fort St. John (which was only an earthen work without any casemated cover) were obliged, thus left to themselves and having no prospect of relief, to sur-










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render prisoners of war. The capitulation was signed on the 3d November. General Montgomery immediately advanced to Sorel, and caused a detachment to cross the St. Lawrence. He established batteries on both sides of the river with a view to command the navigation; to prevent all intercourse between Quebec and Montreal; and, more particularly, the escape of eleven British vessels from the latter. Montreal, without a garrison, and having nothing to oppose to the American troops, capitulated, and was taken possession of by General Montgomery on the 13th November. The ships and vessels were also surrendered to him.

Inadequate as the British force in Canada was, for its defence, against any serious invasion, yet it is impossible not to lament that better arrangements were not made upon the present occasion. Instead of considering his small regular corps as the nucleus upon which he was to rely for the support of his militia and provincials, Governor Carleton appears to have exposed and pushed it unnecessarily forward to his advanced posts. Had he held the right of the St. Lawrence lightly, armed and stationed three or four of the vessels he had at Montreal off the mouth of the Sorel, and kept his regular troops at Montreal, assisted by such militia and provincials as he could have formed under their protection, there seems no

reason why a corps of no greater strength than that of the Americans under General Montgomery should have got possession of Montreal. The American attack was, however, so unexpected, and so immediately followed the commencement of hostilities, that, in all probability, no arrangement for the defence of the Canadian frontier had been contemplated.

General Carleton himself escaped in a boat, and, having passed the American batteries, at night, with muffled oars, reached Quebec in safety.

The American corps, moving upon Quebec by the Kennebec river, was under the orders of General Arnold. It consisted of 1,200 men. The Kennebec is a rapid river, full of rocks, and perfectly unfit for navigation. The same may be said of the Chaudiere, as indeed is implied by its name. General Arnold's party had to advance up one river, and to descend the other; dragging, in the first, their canoes after them, laden with their ammunition and provisions, when the water would enable them so to do; and as often, when impeded by rocks and rapids, carrying the canoe itself, together with all its contents. In their progress, some days they were not able to advance more than five miles. The country between the heads of the two rivers consisted of swamps, forests never before penetrated by man, and the

high rocky ridge, from the foot of which these waters respectively originate. When he quitted the Kennebec, more than a third of his people turned back; General Arnold proceeded, however, with the remainder. The descent of the Chaudiere was worse than the ascent of the Kennebec. They had not been able to bring forward their canoes. They attempted to float their provisions and ammunition on rafts down the Chaudiere, and lost the greatest part of both. They were obliged to eat the few dogs which had accompanied them. On the 3d November they came in sight of the St. Lawrence and the inhabited parts of Canada, to the no small astonishment and wonder of the Canadians. The march had lasted six weeks, for one month of which they had not seen a hut or a human being. It is, perhaps, one of the most wonderful instances of perseverance and spirit of enterprize upon record.

As soon as General Arnold reached the St. Lawrence, he assembled the boats he required at Point Levi. He embarked at Point Levi, and crossing the St. Lawrence by night, to avoid the fire from the guns at Quebec, he landed above the town at Wolfe's Cove, and huttet his people on the Heights of Abraham.

General Montgomery left garrisons at Fort St. John and at Montreal, and joined General Arnold before Quebec on the 5th December. He marched

by the left bank of the St. Lawrence, and brought with him six field-pieces, and five light mortars. The nature of Arnold's route had of course precluded the possibility of his having any ordnance with his detachment. The strength of the united American force in front of Quebec amounted to about 3,000 men.

The garrison of Quebec consisted of only one company. To these were added the seamen and marines of a sloop of war, and the inhabitants of the town. The latter, both French and English, were armed, formed into companies, and showed great zeal and alacrity at this important crisis. Governor Carleton, in all, had about 1,600 bayonets.

The season and the want of heavy artillery prevented the Americans from making any impression upon the defences of Quebec. It was evident that the former would not permit them to remain much longer in their present situation. Governor Carleton had refused to receive a flag of truce, or to enter into any sort of negotiation with them. It was, therefore, necessary either to retire, or to get possession of Quebec by an escalade. The latter, General Montgomery determined to attempt. The night of the 31st December was selected for the enterprize.

The American general caused four attacks to be made. Two upon those fronts facing towards the

Heights of Abraham were feints, to draw the attention of the garrison from the real points. One column, led by Arnold, was to advance by the low ground between the St. Charles and the Heights of Abraham, and thus to penetrate into the lower town by turning the works of the upper town. Another column, led by Montgomery, was to advance between the St. Lawrence and the rocky heights of Cape Diamond, and also to push on into the lower town. From that part of the lower town which it was expected Arnold's party would have been able to get possession of, there is a gate communicating with the upper town; but which, having no ditch or drawbridge, it was conceived would easily be forced, and that the upper town was thus, without much difficulty, to be entered. The same facilities seemed to be offered to the other column, which had to penetrate into the lower town between the St. Lawrence and the cliff, of being able, afterwards, to move forwards into the upper town, as a gate is also to be met with in this part of the line-wall.

At the hour appointed the different detachments were put in motion. Arnold's column advanced according to its prescribed route, but was prevented getting into the lower town by an entrenchment which had been constructed between the wall of the upper town and the water. Checked in front, and confined in the narrow

space between the line-wall and the river, his troops were unexpectedly assailed in the rear by a detachment of the garrison, which had made a sortie at one of the gates of the fronts upon the Heights of Abraham for the purpose. Almost the whole of this column were killed or taken. Arnold himself, having been wounded at the commencement of the affair, had been carried back to the American camp.

At the other extremity of the lower town some works had also been thrown up between the cliff and the St. Lawrence. Montgomery carried the first, or the most advanced entrenchment. He was killed, together with most of his principal officers, at the second. His troops retired in confusion.

It may be observed of this enterprize against Quebec, that the attempt was soldier-like and enterprizing. If we, however, look into the details of the arrangements, they do not appear to have been judicious, or calculated to command success. The escarp of several of the fronts looking to the Plains of Abraham are not more than eighteen feet high. The counterscarp is contemptible, and there is no ditch, and consequently no drawbridge. It is an established maxim in all assaults or escalades, to advance upon as extended a front as possible. There was no necessity, upon the present occasion, to move,

with narrow columns, into confined streets and lanes to become masters of the lower town; having subsequently the upper town, separated from the lower town by a line-wall with flanks in it, to acquire. It would surely have been better policy to have assaulted the upper town at once, and to have endeavoured to escalate, at the same moment, several of the bastions. It is to be remarked that, according to the plan General Montgomery adopted, he had first to force his way into the lower town, and then either to escalate the walls, or force open the gates of the upper town; whereas, had he assaulted the upper town, and been successful, the lower town could have offered no resistance. In endeavouring to penetrate by the lower town he required to be successful in two operations. Had he determined to assault the upper town, he would only have had to have escalated a wall of eighteen feet high, and the place was his. If this reasoning is correct, it would appear that the real assaults ought to have been made at the points which were selected for the feints, and that false attacks only ought to have been directed against the lower town.

1776.

General Arnold, on whom the command devolved after the death of Montgomery, continued

in front of Quebec, notwithstanding the failure of the attempt to carry the place by escalade. His numbers were reduced by sickness and desertion, as well as by the casualties of the assault, to about 800 bayonets. It was proposed to Governor Carleton to avail himself of this diminution of their number, and to move out and attack the Americans. This officer, however, determined to avoid repeating what had always been considered as an error of General Murray's, who, it will be remembered, in 1760, had left the works of Quebec, and, at the head of his garrison, fought the battle of Sillery. Governor Carleton certainly appears to have adopted the most prudent and the most sensible plan. His great object was to preserve Quebec, which ensured, as soon as the season permitted, a communication with England. At present it was evident the Americans could not take it. If he left his works and advanced to attack them, he gave up certain advantages for an uncertain issue. Whilst he remained within Quebec the chances were that he would be able to keep possession of the town. If he moved out and was defeated, his small garrison, diminished in numbers and dispirited at their loss, might have been compelled to surrender.

The American Congress made considerable exertions to reinforce their army in Canada during the early part of this year. About 3,000 troops,

with some heavy artillery, were forwarded to Arnold; and not less than 4,000 men occupied St. John's, Chambly, and Montreal. General Arnold endeavoured to interest the Canadians in the American cause, but without the slightest success; on the contrary, several of the Canadian seigneurs, at the head of small parties of the Canadian militia, surprized and defeated detachments of the Americans.

Such was the posture of affairs in Canada, when, on the 6th May, a squadron of men of war arrived at Quebec from England. They were speedily followed by several divisions of transports, conveying three brigades of infantry, with artillery, stores and ammunition. The Americans immediately withdrew from the Heights of Abraham to Sorel, where they established their head-quarters. The British troops were conveyed up the river. A brigade (that of General Fraser) was encamped at the Three Rivers. On the night of the 7th June the Americans, with a degree of enterprize which reflects great credit on those who projected the measure, crossed over from Sorel, and endeavoured to surprize this brigade. They were, however, repulsed, and suffered severely. The American troops withdrew, upon the advance of the British, from Montreal, Chambly, and Fort St. John. They retreated to Crown Point and Ticonderoga, which latter place they strengthened.

General Carleton was prevented from pursuing his advantages much further this season, from want of craft to navigate Lake Champlain. The Americans had taken possession of every thing upon the lake, during their advance in the preceding summer. He was able, however, to send a detachment to the Isle-aux-Noix, which was abandoned to him without any resistance. He occupied Isle-aux-Noix as his advanced post, and caused every exertion to be made to build gunboats and other vessels at St. John's and the Isle-aux-Noix, to enable him to have the command of Lake Champlain, during the ensuing season.

The Americans appear thus to have evacuated Canada very nearly as rapidly as they had entered it. They certainly did not follow up their first success with sufficient energy. After the capture of Montreal, had circumstances allowed them to have considerably reinforced Montgomery's corps, the result might have been very different. The exertions of Arnold's column were wonderful. No great good was, however, to be expected from this movement. It was possible that, in the alarm of the moment, caused by his most unlooked for appearance, Quebec might have been taken possession of. If he did not succeed in this attempt, the result of this most harassing march was only an addition of a few hundred men (and those in dreadful want of clothing, ammuni-

tion and provisions) to the more considerable column, which, having advanced by Lake Champlain, had, after the fall of Montreal, an easy and certain approach towards Quebec.

1777.

The British government determined to act with vigour, during this summer, against the American Congress. It was proposed to push forward a respectable corps from Canada, by Lake Champlain, to Albany, to be there joined by a force from New York. It was conceived that an army thus assembled in the rear of the New England provinces, from whence their operations could be afterwards directed, according to circumstances, would have the happiest effects, in inducing the inhabitants of those districts to return to their allegiance, and to abandon the contest in which they had engaged. In co-operation with these movements, a small corps was to ascend the St. Lawrence from Montreal, and cross Lake Ontario to Oswego. From Oswego it was to proceed to Albany, by the Mondago River, Oneida Lake, and the Mohawk River, having to capture a fort called Fort Stanwix, situated at the portage between Wood-creek (which runs into the Oneida Lake) and the Mohawk River, flowing towards the

Hudson. The Americans had got possession of this post.

In pursuance of this plan of operations, General Burgoyne left Canada at the head of rather more than 7,000 regular troops, including a detachment of 350 artillery. He had 500 Indians, and three companies of Canadians. His total force may be reckoned to have been about 8,000 men. The Americans had abandoned Crown Point, but occupied Ticonderoga in force. They had repaired and strengthened the old French lines, added block-houses, and constructed an entire new work, in addition, on the eastern or opposite side of the lake which they called Fort Independence, communicating, by a massive floating bridge, with the works at Ticonderoga. General Burgoyne came in sight of Ticonderoga on the 1st July. His heavy ordnance joined him on the 4th. On the 6th, the Americans set fire to their block-houses and evacuated the position, retreating, one column (in 220 boats, protected by five armed gallies) up the narrow winding creek, called the South River, at the head of Lake Champlain; a second column fell back by a road leading from Fort Independence into the country on the east side of Lake Champlain. A brigade of British, supported by a brigade of German troops, pursued the last-mentioned column, and on the next morning (the 7th July) came up with the Americans at a place

called Huberton, from whence, after severe fighting and consequent casualties on both sides, they were further dislodged. The British gun-boats, and a brigade of infantry, followed the American flotilla to Skeenesborough, (now Whitehall,) at the head of the South River. The whole of the American craft was taken or destroyed; and the British troops, having landed at Skeenesborough, pursued their enemy as far as Fort Anne, about sixteen miles from Skeenesborough, on the direct road towards Fort Edward on the Hudson, from which it was only distant twelve miles. The Americans, in retreating, as explained, upon Huberton and Fort Anne, abandoned Lake George and Fort George (at the south end of the lake formerly called Fort William Henry, and built, it may be remembered, originally by Sir William Johnson, in the year 1755) to the British. It was rather expected that they would have made a stand at Fort George.

By following the Americans upon these lines, the British were drawn from their resources, and the army was considerably dispersed. Its left was at Huberton and Castleton, and its right in front of Skeenesborough, with an advanced corps at Fort Anne. In a country which afforded no resources, and with the exception of the roads and the very few settlements upon those roads, was literally one continued forest, these were

considerable inconveniences. Every ration issued to the troops was to be fetched from the boats. The farther the army advanced, the greater, it is evident, these difficulties necessarily became.

In the repeated movements which had been made from Hudson's River into Lake Champlain, in the Seven Years' War, from the first attempt by Sir William Johnson, in 1755, to that of Colonel Haviland's, in 1760, the British and Provincial troops had constantly and invariably moved by Lake George. From Fort George, at the head of Lake George, to Fort Edward upon the Hudson, was the established line of communication, and afforded a good practicable road, over which considerable quantities of ordnance had been frequently conveyed. The distance, at the very utmost, was not more than fifteen miles. It seems to have been an error of the British General, after having destroyed the American flotilla at Skeenesborough, not to have returned to Ticonderoga, and advanced by Lake George, and from thence to Fort Edward on the Hudson. He sent his provision boats, ordnance, baggage, and one brigade, by this line; but this, it may be observed, although unquestionably very judicious and proper, yet did not diminish the necessity of also forwarding supplies to his troops at Huberton, Castleton, Skeenesborough, and Fort Anne, until they could

be fed from the depôt which was to be formed at Fort George.

It was on the 6th July, that the Americans had retreated from Ticonderoga; from which day Lake George had been open to the British army. Nevertheless, it was not before the 29th of the same month, that the first convoy of provisions arrived at Fort George. It is, however, to be observed, that the subsequent convoys were to be expected in much less time. The cause of the delay with the first, was the difficulty and labour of conveying the necessary boats from Lake Champlain into Lake George. These boats, once in Lake George, would be kept constantly employed. On the same day that the first convoy arrived at Fort George, the British took possession of Fort Edward, which was evacuated. General Burgoyne was now (on the 29th July) upon the Hudson, having his depôt of provisions in the rear, within fifteen miles of him, and to which he had a good road; and which depôt could be supplied, by water conveyance, to any extent. He was not more than fifty-five miles from Albany; having the advantage of the Hudson to convey his stores, with the exception of one or two short carrying places. There seemed, as yet, no doubt of his being able to reach the object of his movement.

The British army remained a fortnight in the

neighbourhood of Fort Edward. Provisions, ammunition, and boats (for the conveyance of these articles upon the Hudson) were forwarded from Fort George during this period. The Americans, in the mean while, assembled about 7,000 troops, together with a large body of armed inhabitants, behind the Mohawk River, with an advanced corps at Stillwater. The British army was on the left or western bank of the Hudson. The road to Albany, and Albany itself, is on the opposite side. On the 14th August General Burgoyne caused a bridge of rafts to be constructed above the point where a small river, called the Batten-kill, runs into the Hudson. It seems to have been injudicious (whilst thus in the very act of crossing his army over a large river) to have sent a small detachment to a considerable distance, on the side he was withdrawing from, to collect horses and cattle for the use of the army. It was exposing the corps thus employed (on a duty which was of a nature the most likely to be resisted) at the very moment its support was withdrawn. If the object in view (the acquiring the horses and cattle) was material, this service, it would appear, might have been attempted whilst the army was stationary; and certainly required, to ensure its execution, a larger force. A detachment of 200 dismounted dragoons, 150 Canadian volunteers, 100 Indians, and 50 British marksmen, making in

all 500 men, with two field-pieces, was ordered to march to Bennington, (about thirty miles from the British head-quarters and within twenty of the American corps at Stillwater,) to procure horses, and to seize a depôt of cattle and flour said to be collected there for the use of the enemy. From the numbers and composition of this detachment, the British general must have been led to expect no resistance would be offered. The officer entrusted with this duty having reported that the Americans had a corps of 1,800 men at Bennington, an additional force of three companies and two guns was immediately sent after him. Before, however, this reinforcement could join, the original detachment was destroyed. The enemy, following up his blow, attacked the second party on its march, and drove it back with the loss of the two guns and a considerable number of officers and men. The British lost four guns, and had twenty-six officers and 400 men killed and wounded upon this occasion. This affair took place at Saint-coick, about five miles from Bennington, to which latter place the British detachment never was able to advance.

This unfortunate check was not only to be deplored on account of the positive loss sustained by the British army in consequence, but as tending to encourage the militia and armed inhabitants in their resistance. From the date of its occur-

rence General Burgoyne's army had no power or influence beyond the ground they actually occupied.

General Burgoyne remained stationary nearly a month after this event, in order to allow time for stores and provisions to be forwarded to his army. His bridge of rafts over the Hudson had been carried away. He had brought back his advanced corps by means of boats. On the 13th September he had thirty days provisions up with his army. He again crossed the Hudson on that day, on a bridge of boats. The Americans had, in the mean while, advanced in front of Stillwater in considerable numbers. On the 19th September General Burgoyne attacked them. The action was most severe. The British suffered considerably in killed and wounded. No advantages were, however, acquired. The Americans continued to occupy the same ground, which they strengthened by every means in their power. The British troops were equally employed in fortifying their position. The armies remained in sight of each other for nineteen days. It has been suggested that General Burgoyne ought to have fallen back when he found the enemy in such force as to render his further advance impossible. He had, however, received a communication of a movement from New York up the Hudson being about to be undertaken, which he conceived

would induce the American troops in his front to be withdrawn. Under these circumstances he determined to remain in his position as long as his provisions would allow him. On the 7th October the Americans, who had received considerable reinforcements, attacked the British. They penetrated by the right towards the close of the day. To prevent their getting upon his rear, General Burgoyne fell back, during the night, to Saratoga. In this situation, surrounded by the enemy, who had even made his appearance in force between Fort Edward and Fort George, and whose troops, from the neighbourhood of Huberton, had rallied, and invested Ticonderoga, General Burgoyne had no choice but to capitulate. His force had been reduced by the garrison of 900 men, who had been left at Ticonderoga; by 2,495 killed, wounded, and prisoners; by 500 sick at the time he surrendered; and by the desertion of the Indians and Canadians, to about 3,500 men. The capitulation took place on the 16th October. Gates, the American general, had 16,000 men under arms.

It was part of the plan for this campaign, it will be remembered, to send a detachment from Oswego by the Mohawk River, to Albany. This corps, thus employed, consisted of 700 regulars, with eight pieces of ordnance, and about 1,000 Indians, and was entrusted to Colonel St. Leger.

Although not equally unfortunate with the army under the orders of General Burgoyne, in being obliged to surrender, yet it was not able to advance beyond the Carrying Place, at the head of the Wood Creek and the Mohawk River. Colonel St. Leger invested Fort Stanwix, but was obliged to raise the siege and retire precipitately upon the advance of the militia of the country, and the dispersion of his Indian allies. He fell back to Oswego and from thence to Montreal.

It may be remarked, in respect to the proposed plan for this campaign, that the success of the first operation (namely, the assembling a respectable corps d'armée at Albany) was unfortunately made to depend upon too many contingencies. The movement from New York, in co-operation with that from Canada, could not take place (if the enemy should be in force in New Jersey or Pennsylvania) until considerable reinforcements should arrive from England. This seems to have been a fundamental error. In ordering the corps from Canada forward to Albany, it was evident that its communication with Lake Champlain must cease, after it advanced across the Hudson. At any rate, such an event was to be guarded against; and as, in all probability, the Canadian corps would have, in consequence, to draw its supplies from Albany, the communication between New York and Albany, if not the possession of Albany

itself, ought, it would appear, to have been considered as objects of primary importance, and been ordered to have been attended to from New York. In looking into the details of the campaign, it is impossible to deny but that the British army might have been conducted to Albany. If this object was to be accomplished at all, it was however to be done as soon as the troops had ten days provisions up with them, instead of waiting for thirty. On the 13th September, when General Burgoyne crossed the Hudson, he had thirty days provisions ; but the time necessarily employed in collecting these provisions had doubled the number of his enemy's troops, and given the Americans leisure to prepare every obstacle. With reference, however, to the movement itself, it is to be observed, that had it taken place, and had General Burgoyne reached Albany, having his communication cut off with Lake Champlain, and not opened with New York, he might and, in all probability, would, have been compelled to lay down his arms at Albany, instead of Saratoga. The operation cannot, therefore, be considered to have been judiciously planned, in so much (as was said in the early part of these Reflections) as its complete success was made to depend upon various contingencies, and upon the fortunate result of other movements, which, from circumstances, could not be under-

taken until too late. When, in the latter part of the year, Sir Henry Clinton was able to move up the North or Hudson's River, General Burgoyne had already surrendered.

In reflecting further upon the events of this campaign, it is impossible not to regret the misapplication of the troops sent to Oswego, under Colonel St. Leger, in pursuit of an object, the attainment of which could have no important influence upon the result of the campaign; and also that no less than 3,000 men were left in Canada. Colonel St. Leger's corps, although not numerous, would have sufficed to have garrisoned Ticonderoga, which was a heavy demand upon General Burgoyne's strength. There was no enemy in Canada, nor (whilst the British army was in advance at the head of Lake Champlain) was any to be expected. If 2,000 men, from the troops allotted for Canada, had been added to St. Leger's corps, and the whole been appropriated to hold Ticonderoga, Fort George, Fort Edward, and the bridge over the Hudson, (in fact to keep up General Burgoyne's communications as he advanced,) he would have been in greater strength, and of course better prepared to act with vigour when circumstances required it. With greater means (and followed up by respectable reserves) a movement upon Albany might have been undertaken from Canada, independently of any co-operation

from New York. The object, however, after all, of placing a corps at Albany, to threaten the rear of the Massachusetts and Connecticut provinces, was to be accomplished by water from New York at one quarter the expense and trouble; confining the operations from Canada to the capture of Ticonderoga and the destruction of the American boats and flotilla upon Lake Champlain.

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THE LATE WAR WITH AMERICA.

THE Congress of the United States of America declared war against Great Britain on the 18th June, 1812. The great object and inducement of the American government was, unquestionably, to gain possession of Canada. Although, in the spring of 1812, the French career of conquest had already been arrested in Spain, and the throne of Napoleon began to totter; yet neither the President of America, nor his confidential advisers, anticipated its fall. During the long war in which we had been engaged with France, the French flag had been nearly swept from the ocean. The number of American merchant-vessels had, in consequence, rapidly augmented. The produce of the French West Indian islands, and of the Islands of France and Bourbon, in the Eastern Seas, was brought to France by American ships. The detention of American ships, (when sus-

pected of being so employed,) and the condemnation of the cargoes, gave rise to complaints and disputes, and made the British government and British men-of-war very unpopular in America. The capture by Great Britain of the whole of the French colonies terminated these discussions. The French had no longer any produce to send home by neutrals. The feeling of irritation still, however, existed. The necessity of manning the British navy caused the government to authorize the commanders of the King's ships to search for British seamen in American merchant-vessels. The facility and encouragement for desertion, afforded by American ships, rendered the exercise of this right of search indispensable. It was not, and from the nature of the duty it could not, always be exercised with temper and forbearance. Many angry representations were made, in consequence, by the American government. The necessity of blockading the enemy's ports, and, in the course of the war, occasionally a considerable extent of the coasts of those countries, which were the scene of military operations, in order to prevent the French from being supplied with warlike stores and provisions by neutrals, deprived the Americans of a very lucrative trade. When Napoleon issued his famous Berlin and Milan decrees, by which he authorized and

ordered the confiscation of all British manufactures; of all colonial produce conveyed to Europe by British ships; and of all ships, of whatever nation, which had been visited by a British man of war, or had anchored in a British port; corresponding acts of rigour were judged necessary on the part of the British government. Neutrals were prohibited going to France, until they had anchored in a British port, which was pretty tantamount to preventing their going to France at all. That this was the best method of meeting the French decrees is not quite clear. Had we continued steadily the line of conduct we had adopted in the first instance, taking no notice of the Berlin and Milan regulations; contenting ourselves with examining all neutrals bound to our enemy's ports, in order to prevent warlike stores and provisions from being imported, (the necessity of which proceeding must have been evident to the neutrals themselves,) and allowing them afterwards to continue their course, as they thought proper, it would rather appear that the Americans, of their own accord, would have avoided all intercourse with France, where they were sure of having their property confiscated. Napoleon must have revoked his decrees, or given up all commerce whatsoever. It was the wish and intention of France to embroil us, if possible, with the Americans. The leading members of the

American government had, already, an angry feeling towards England, and were anxious for a plausible excuse for taking possession of Canada, (which they had been led to believe they could do whenever they thought proper,) occupied as Great Britain was with the war in Europe. Under these circumstances, our Orders in Council may be said to have been impolitic. Napoleon's decrees were arbitrary and unjust. They were the mandates of an angry despot. The undivided odium of their execution, as well as that attending their issue, might, perhaps, with advantage, have been left to the French rulers. By promulgating our Orders in Council we descended from the high ground on which we stood. In following, in some degree, the footsteps of our enemy, we placed the Americans in the dilemma of being compelled either to abstain equally from all commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France, or to side with that one of the belligerents which, it might appear to them, best suited their interests. The power and influence of France, upon the continent, was at its height. The reverses, which so soon afterwards overtook Napoleon, were not then, as has already been observed, foreseen. The class of people, all over Europe, but particularly in England, from whom the Americans were likely to receive their notions and impressions as to European politics, dazzled

by the French successes, were but too apt to foretell the fall and debasement of Great Britain to the rank of a power of a very secondary nature. Under the impression that, in making common cause with the French, they were wisely uniting themselves with the strongest; acting, moreover, under the influence of angry feelings, the origin of which it has been endeavoured to trace; and flattered with the idea of the easy conquest of Canada, the American Congress declared war against England.

1812.

The American government proposed to follow up their declaration of war by an immediate invasion of Canada. It was intended, in the first campaign, to take possession of Amherstberg, to occupy the Niagara district, and to move upon Montreal with as little delay as possible. Previously to the commencement of hostilities, a division of 2,500 men was already not far from Amherstberg, having been assembled avowedly to act against some of the Indian nations, but secretly with a view to the projected operations against Canada. The force of the corps destined for the Niagara operation amounted to 6,300; and that against Montreal about 7,000.

The British regular troops in Canada may be stated to have been 4,500 men ; of these numbers 3,000 were in garrison at Quebec and Montreal ; 1,500 were allotted to Upper Canada, and were divided at Kingston, York, the Niagara frontier, and Amherstberg ; having also to furnish a detachment at Joseph's Island at the head of Lake Huron. On Lake Ontario the Americans had one armed brig ; the British, one ship of about three hundred tons, and three smaller vessels. On Lake Erie the Americans had also one armed brig, and four or five schooners ; the British, on Lake Erie, had nothing.

Notwithstanding the American state of preparation, it is worth while to observe that the first blow was struck by the British. The detachment at Joseph's Island, which consisted of only one company, was embarked by the officer in command, as soon as he heard of the declaration of war, and, assisted by about two hundred Canadian voyageurs, and double the number of Indians, he proceeded to the Island of Michilimakinak, on which the Americans had a fort with a garrison of sixty men. The Americans surrendered by capitulation on the 17th July.

The Island of Michilimakinak is nine miles in circumference. It commands the entrance from Lake Huron into Lake Michigan, and is about forty miles from the Island of St. Joseph. The

Americans have rather a brisk trade carried on in schooners and sailing vessels, from Detroit, through Lake Huron, to the head of Lake Michigan. The capture of the Island of Michilimakinak interrupted this trade, and was of consequence, as giving confidence and protection to the Canadian voyageurs and Indians in the British interests employed in the fur trade in these distant countries. In any other point of view this little expedition was not very material.

The American corps destined to act against Amherstberg was assembled at Detroit on the 5th July. It has been already stated to have consisted of 2,500 men. This force crossed over, on the 12th July, from Detroit to Sandwich, and advanced towards Amherstberg. The garrison at Amherstberg consisted of 420 men, of whom 300 were militia; there were also 150 Indians. The River-aux-Canards runs into the Detroit River between Sandwich, from whence the Americans advanced, and Amherstberg. The British occupied the bank of this river and the bridge over it as an advanced post. Some skirmishing took place at this river, but the Americans were never able to force the passage. The Americans drew their provisions from Detroit; and Detroit itself was supplied by convoys conducted by the road from Miamis, traced at some little distance along the shore of the Detroit River opposite to Amherstberg.

A body of Indians and some militia, supported by a few regular troops, were passed across the river from Amherstberg, to a place called Maguaga, which completely intercepted the American communications. On the 7th August, the American corps at Sandwich retreated to Detroit, and detached a force of 500 men to dislodge the party at Maguaga.

Whilst these operations were in progress, General Brock, who had the command in Upper Canada, arrived at Amherstberg. He brought with him a reinforcement of 300 men, (260 of whom were Upper Canadian Militia,) having conducted them in person in open boats from Long Point in Lake Erie. He had previously forwarded two small detachments of regulars, amounting both together to 160 men. Upon his arrival at Amherstberg he immediately moved the troops forwards to Sandwich, and established a battery against Fort Detroit. On the morning of the 15th August he crossed the river, and landed at Springwell, (a little lower down than Detroit,) at the head of thirty artillery; 300 regular infantry; 400 Upper Canadian militia; and 600 Indians. He made preparations to assault the fort upon that front facing to the land, where it was understood not to be so strong as on the river. The American general surrendered by capitulation. The force opposed to General Brock was

certainly not less than 2,500 men; and there were thirty-three pieces of ordnance mounted at Fort Detroit. A vessel, but unarmed, was moreover in the harbour.

General Brock left a garrison at Detroit, and hastened back to the Niagara frontier. He arrived at Fort George on the 24th August.

In the detail (in a preceding page) of the causes which led to the declaration of war by the American government, the British Orders in Council have been alluded to. In the American manifesto these Orders in Council are particularly mentioned. As Sir George Prevost, the governor of Canada, had heard from England of the repeal of the orders complained of, he naturally was led to believe that, the alleged cause being removed, the war itself would not be persevered in. He, in consequence, proposed an armistice to the American general, commanding upon Lake Champlain, which was agreed upon for the whole frontier, until the latter could receive orders from his government. The American government did not approve of the armistice, and hostilities recommenced on the 8th September.

The conduct of the Governor of Canada, in agreeing to this armistice, has been censured. It does not appear, however, how he could, with propriety, have acted otherwise; nor have any military disadvantages attending the same been

pointed out, worthy of serious attention. It has been said that General Brock, after his return to the Niagara frontier, on the 24th August, might have immediately taken Fort Niagara, which would have had the happiest effects upon the campaign, if not upon the war. General Brock's force was not more than 1,200 men upon the Niagara River, one half of whom were militia. The Americans had 6,300. Offensive operations were, therefore, not likely to have been undertaken by the British. The capture of the fort at Niagara could not, moreover, at any rate, even if it had taken place, have prevented the Americans from passing the Niagara, above the Falls, between the Chippeway and Fort Erie, or below the Falls, from Lewis Town to Queen's Town. In fact, it would, in General Brock's possession, have been rather an inconvenience, compelling him to deprive himself of 300 or 400 men from his already too small disposable force for its garrison. In defensive warfare delay is every thing. The war was essentially defensive on the part of the British. The armistice, consequently, was so far advantageous to the British, that time was gained to embody the militia and make other arrangements necessary for the defence of the province.

The American force, assembled upon the Niagara frontier, was divided into three corps. 1,100 men were at Fort Niagara; 3,200 at Lewis Town;

and 2,000 at Black Rock and Buffalo. The British troops opposite, consisting of 1,200, occupied Fort Erie and Fort George, the two extreme points of their line. The flank companies of the 49th, and two companies of militia were stationed at Queen's Town, opposite to Lewis Town.

On the night of the 11th October, the Americans crossed the River, from Lewis Town to Queen's Town, which is here about a quarter of a mile broad. The boats landed two hundred and fifty men, and immediately returned for another detachment. The officer in command at Queen's Town had stationed the light company of the 49th, and one company of militia, upon the brow of the hill, above Queen's Town, commanding the River; and on which hill he had also a battery of two heavy guns. The grenadiers and the other militia company were in the town near the beach, to prevent the disembarkation of the enemy. This last mentioned detachment was actively engaged with the first division of the Americans, who had effected their landing, when day-light appeared. General Brock, who had galloped over from Fort George, seeing an additional body of the enemy (which had just been ferried over) about to land, ordered the light company and the militia to descend from the brow of the hill, to the assistance of the grenadiers; who, he was afraid, would be overpowered. Another party of

the enemy's boats (which he, of course, was not aware of) had disembarked, in the meanwhile, 400 or 500 men above Queen's Town. These troops pushed for the summit of the hill, the moment they saw the light infantry withdrawn. General Brock, perceiving his error, endeavoured to retake the hill, and was unfortunately killed in the attempt. The British troops were obliged to retire. They took up a position upon the ridge, the extreme south end of which forms the height above Queen's Town. They were reinforced by 300 militia; 50 Indians; and a detachment of 380 men from Fort George. The whole force now amounted to 1,000 men. The command had devolved upon General Sheaffe, after the death of General Brock. The Americans were attacked in their turn. One general officer; seventy-one officers; and 858 non-commissioned officers and men laid down their arms. The remainder escaped in their boats. The American troops, who crossed the river, amounted to about 1,600. The British lost in this affair, seventy-one non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded. General Brock and his aide-de-camp were the only officers killed. The American loss must have been heavy. Many of their boats were sunk by shot from the two guns on the hill, both during their advance and retreat.

The Americans certainly conducted this opera-

tion very ill; in not following up their success, and supporting their advanced division, without delay. In his official letter to his government, the American general lays the blame upon his troops, who, he states, could not be persuaded to embark. In an operation of this sort, it is evidently desirable to transport the troops as rapidly, and in as considerable numbers, at a time, as possible. The Americans appear to have had too few boats employed upon the present occasion.

The American general now determined to endeavour to pass the Niagara above the Falls. For this purpose 2,000 of the troops from Lewis Town, were ordered to Black Rock and Buffaloe, to join the 2,000 already there: 4,000 men were, in consequence, assembled for this operation.

The British troops between Chippeway and Fort Erie, comprehending the garrison of the latter, were only 700 men, militia included. They were scattered in small detachments, and had four different landing-places to protect, independently of Chippeway and Fort Erie. On the night of the 28th November, the Americans sent across an advanced corps, in ten large boats, with orders to take possession of a landing-place, called the Red House, and to secure the guns in the battery. It was intended to pass over the remainder of the corps at day-light, if the advanced guard should have effected their landing, and been able

to maintain themselves in this position, which would have become, in that case, a tête-de-pont for the American army. One half only of the American boats effected the passage; the other five missed the landing-place. The troops who landed had some partial success at first; but the British detachments, collecting upon the alarm being given, they were ultimately obliged to re-imbark; leaving thirty of their number, prisoners behind them. The operation having thus failed, the American troops were withdrawn from the Niagara frontier, and went into winter-quarters.

The corps meant to penetrate to Montreal, assembled at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain. It consisted of 7,000 men. On the 15th November it advanced as far as the American village of Champlain close to the Canadian frontier. A brigade of British infantry and 900 Lower Canadian militia were immediately passed over the St. Lawrence, from Montreal to La Prairie; and moved forwards, as far as L'Acadie, on the line of the American approach. A piquet of Canadian voyageurs and militia was stationed at the bridge over the La Colle, within three miles of the American head-quarters at Champlain. An American patrol was driven back by this piquet. No further operations took place upon this part of the frontier. The American troops were ordered to the rear, and placed in winter-quarters.

Soon after the recommencement of hostilities at the expiration of the armistice on the 8th September, the American government had sent a competent naval officer, (Commodore Chauncey,) with 500 seamen, to Sackett's Harbour, on Lake Ontario. This officer, by the beginning of November, had already either built or altered (so as to answer for the purpose of carrying guns) six schooners. The Americans had acquired these vessels in addition to their brig. They now had consequently on Lake Ontario, one brig, and six schooners, carrying in all forty-eight guns. The British marine had not been augmented, but consisted, as at the breaking out of the war, of one ship and three smaller vessels. The whole were mounted with fifty guns.

The campaign of 1812, which was closed by the repulse of the American patrol at La Colle, appears, as far as the American movements are concerned, to be almost beneath criticism. Their operations were loose, unconnected, and exhibited a great want of vigour and enterprize. The surrender of the Fort of Detroit, and of the corps destined to attack Amherstberg, to such an inferior force as General Brock's detachment; the not being able, with such superior means, to force the passage of the Niagara; and the complete failure of the invasion at Montreal, where no attempt was even made, gave great confidence to the militia

and to the inhabitants, generally, of the Canadas. The former had been very useful and willing; and they had an opportunity of showing that their services were to be depended upon. They had now acquired by their success, a spirit of reliance upon their own exertions, and a dislike to the enemy; from which the happiest effects might be expected in the further prosecution of the contest. In this respect the death of General Brock may be considered as a national loss. He had gained, by his firm yet conciliatory conduct, the greatest influence over the Canadian settlers, as also with the Indians.

In reflecting upon this campaign, it is to be remembered that it was not until the news of the renewal of hostilities on the 8th September (and of the American President having refused to ratify the armistice proposed in consequence of the repeal of the Orders in Council) reached England, that the British government were aware of their being seriously engaged in war with the United States. The British declaration of war was not issued, in fact, until the commencement of the next year. Great Britain had not, therefore, put forth her strength. No reinforcements had been sent to Canada; nor any steps taken to have a flotilla on the lakes. With the usual peace garrison the American invasions had been repelled. The great evil to be dreaded from our success, was, that too

much security and too much confidence might perhaps be generated. The experience of all ages has shown that no enemy is to be despised. It is not what he has done; but what he may do, that is to be guarded against.

1813.

The American government, disappointed at the result of their operations of the preceding year, (in which they had been foiled in their several attempts to penetrate into Canada,) determined to make greater efforts to obtain success, in the present campaign. It was proposed, as before, to invade Canada with three separate corps. The first was to rendezvous at Sandusky, at the western end of Lake Erie, for the purpose of retaking Detroit and of acquiring possession of Amherstberg. The second to assemble at Sackett's Harbour, in Lake Ontario, and to be employed in the capture of Kingston and of York. This corps was also destined to be subsequently sent against Forts George and Erie on the Niagara frontier, in co-operation with a force collected at Buffaloe. The third operation was the attack upon Montreal, by an armament to be collected in the neighbourhood of Lake Champlain. In this movement it was expected that the troops from Lake Ontario would

be able to assist, by descending the St. Lawrence, after the successful accomplishment of the objects more immediately entrusted to their care.

Sandusky, it has been already stated, was the head-quarters and point fixed upon for the assembling of the American troops destined to form the division which was to invade the Amherstberg district. So early as in January the Americans began to collect their force opposite this part of the frontier. The British, it will be remembered, were in possession of Detroit, (which had been captured by General Brock in the preceding campaign.) This was the British head-quarters, with an advanced piquet at French Town, forty-five miles from Detroit. On the 18th January the Americans dislodged this piquet, and occupied French Town. The officer commanding the British troops advanced from Detroit to Brown's Town. His disposable force consisted of only 500 men, (a great part of whom were militia,) and 450 Indians; he had also four field-pieces. The American corps in front of French Town amounted to 1,100. On the 22d January the British commanding officer, Colonel Proctor, attacked them, and gained a complete victory, taking the American general, and 500 of his troops prisoners. He himself lost 182 men in killed and wounded.

Notwithstanding their success, it was judged

prudent to retire the British troops in the evening of the very same day of this affair, in consequence of the large American force known to be in the neighbourhood. Colonel Proctor withdrew to Detroit and thence to Sandwich.

The American general did not, however, advance either very rapidly or in great force. He moved his head-quarters from Sandusky to the River Miamis. On the Miamis he occupied himself in constructing a redoubt for the security of his provisions and stores; and he also gave directions for a similar work to be executed near the mouth of the Sandusky River. It would rather appear by these precautionary measures, that he was not so strong as had been imagined. It was evident, at any rate, that he was waiting for further reinforcements.

Colonel Proctor, having received some additional troops and militia, embarked at Amherstberg, on the 23d April, at the head of nearly 1,000 men. He ascended the Miamis River, and landed on the 28th of the same month within a mile and a half of the American work called Fort Meigs. He was here joined by 1,200 Indians. Fort Meigs is on the south side of the river. The British had landed on the north. The river was, of course, between them and the Fort. On the 1st May, the British opened a fire from eight heavy pieces of ordnance, from a battery which

they had established on the north, or their own side of the river. The flank companies of the 41st, 300 militia, and 300 Indians with two six-pounders and two small howitzers, were passed over the river to the south side; and on the 3d May a fire was also directed on the Fort from these field-guns. This arrangement, by necessitating the carrying on of two operations, and the dividing of a force, already not more than equal to the object in view, seems to have been erroneous. On the 5th May the Americans availed themselves of the apparently injudicious situation of the British troops; and, passing over a detachment in boats lower down the river, attacked the principal battery on the north, and the light battery on the south side of the river, at the same time. The Americans were ultimately repulsed; but they were so far successful, that it was judged necessary to raise the siege. Colonel Proctor retired to Sandwich, taking with him his guns from the batteries. On the 20th July Colonel Proctor again advanced towards the American coast; and disembarked on the 1st August, at the mouth of the Sandusky River, having under his orders about 400 regular troops, and a party of 200 Indians. His object was to capture the Fort the Americans had constructed at this point; and to destroy the stores and provisions collected for the use of the troops with which they proposed

to invade the Amherstberg district. On the 2d August he opened a fire, from four field-pieces, upon the work; and then attempted to get possession of it by escalade. He was repulsed with the loss of ninety-six men killed and wounded. He retreated to Sandwich.

At the commencement of the war in the preceding year, it will be remembered that the British had no naval establishment upon Lake Erie. The Americans, as described in page 106, had two armed brigs and several schooners. Aware of the importance of the command of the navigation of the Lake, with a view not only to their own hostile operations, but also to prevent supplies and reinforcements from being forwarded to the British at Amherstberg, the American government had selected Presqu'isle as their naval station; and had ordered the construction of two brigs of war in addition to the brigs, schooners, and craft they already had on Lake Erie. It had been proposed at the British head-quarters, to attack Presqu'isle, and to destroy the two brigs before they were launched. A detachment of British troops was sent in consequence, from Upper Canada to Long Point, in Lake Erie, opposite to Presqu'isle, to be employed in co-operation with the troops from Amherstberg, against Presqu'isle. These arrangements were not, however, made sufficiently early in the season. The very day after

the failure of the attempt to carry the fort upon the Sandusky River by assault, the American flotilla (including the two new brigs) sailed from Presqu'isle to cruise off Amherstberg. The Americans were now decidedly masters of Lake Erie, and no reinforcements or provisions could be forwarded by water, to the neighbourhood of Amherstberg. Provisions seem to have been the greatest difficulty. The troops from Long Point having been united to those already at Amherstberg, there were now nearly 1,000 British soldiers and 3,500 Indians assembled in that neighbourhood. If they could have been fed, and provided with ammunition and necessaries, the number of the British, assisted by the Indians, and to whom also the Militia might have been added in case of need, were not, consequently, so very inadequate to the defence of the Amherstberg frontier. The great object was to open the communication with the Niagara district for a supply of provisions, and which could only be done by the destruction of the American vessels on Lake Erie. A ship of war had been for some time on the stocks at Amherstberg. Every exertion was made to complete her. She was launched on the 5th September, and being manned with a few seamen and 150 soldiers, she sailed in company with some smaller sloops and schooners, which the British had built or collected in the course of the sum-

mer, to attack the American squadron. The action was fought on the 10th September. The British were defeated, the ship and some inferior craft were taken. The Americans were now not only masters of the Lake, but there appeared no chance, for the present, of being able to deprive them of their naval superiority.

Immediately after their naval victory, the American vessels and boats were employed in carrying their troops, who had been so long on the Sandusky and on the Miamis Rivers, to the neighbourhood of Amherstberg. This corps of the enemy's had been considerably reinforced; and a regiment of mounted men, 1,200 strong, had lately joined it. The British evacuated Detroit and Amherstberg, and retreated up the Thames. The American infantry landed three miles below Amherstberg. The cavalry marched round the head of Lake Erie to Detroit, from whence they were ferried across the Detroit River. The British continued to retreat up the Thames; the Americans followed, and on the 4th October at Chatham, overtook the boats with the British provisions, baggage, and reserve ammunition. On the 5th October, about a mile and a half in front of the Moravian settlement, General Proctor determined to make a stand, and drew up his small force. His numbers under arms were reduced to not quite 500, with as many Indians, and one gun.

Dispirited, tired, and overwhelmed by the very superior numbers of the enemy, who were certainly not less than 5,000 men, the British troops gave way almost immediately. The country between the Moravian settlement and Ancaster upon the Ouse, is even now but very partially settled. In 1813 there was hardly a road. The distance is 85 miles. This was the line of the British retreat, or rather flight. On their arrival at Ancaster on the 17th October, there were only 204 rank and file remaining, out of the thousand, which was the strength of this division when it evacuated Amherstberg.

Lake Ontario is generally free from ice on the 1st April, but the St. Lawrence is not navigable before the 16th May. In their plan of operations for this campaign, the American government proposed to avail themselves of this circumstance, and were anxious that the enterprizes against Kingston and York should be undertaken as soon as Lake Ontario could be navigated; and whilst the state of the St. Lawrence would prevent any reinforcements being forwarded from Montreal or Quebec. In pursuance of this arrangement a force, of about 6,000 men, was assembled early in April at Sackett's Harbour; and the American squadron, consisting of a ship, a brig, and eleven schooners, was prepared for service. The first operation the American general determined to

undertake was the capture of York. The American vessels sailed from Sackett's Harbour on the 25th April, and arrived off York on the 27th. They had on board about 2,000 troops for the attack upon York. There were 300 regular soldiers and as many militia at York, together with forty Indians.

The Americans landed on the beach to the westward of York, about a mile beyond the present advanced coast battery. The British retreated through York towards Kingston, after having endeavoured to check the enemy's advance, and sustained a loss of about 130 in killed and wounded. The Americans suffered severely by the accidental explosion of the magazine at the present earthen work, about a mile to the westward of the town. The British, previously to their quitting York, burnt a ship on the stocks, nearly completed, and which had been intended as a reinforcement to their Lake Ontario squadron. The Americans sailed from York upon the 8th May, and arrived the same evening off the Four Mile Creek, close to the mouth of the Niagara River. Here the troops were landed, with a view to the proposed operations against Forts George and Erie. The vessels were employed until the 25th May in sailing backwards and forwards between Sackett's Harbour and Four Mile Creek, bringing the remainder of the corps from Sackett's

Harbour to the Niagara frontier, with the exception of two schooners detached to cruise off Kingston to watch the motions of the British.

The British force on the Niagara frontier consisted of 1,800 regular troops, 500 militia, and 40 Indians. In the neighbourhood of Fort George 1,000 of the troops, 300 of the militia and the few Indians were stationed: 800 troops, and 200 militia were consequently all the force that could be spared for the remainder of this frontier, including the garrison for Fort Erie.

On the morning of the 27th May, under the protection of the guns from Fort Niagara, which bear upon the British shore and completely command it, and also of the fire of their flotilla, which carried fifty-one guns, the American army (divided into three brigades, and consisting of 7,000 men) effected their landing. The British troops opposed their disembarkation with great spirit, and did not retreat until they had lost 445 men in killed and wounded. General Vincent, who commanded, retired upon Queen's Town and from thence to Beaver Dam, and subsequently to Burlington Heights at the head of Lake Ontario. He withdrew his troops from Fort Erie and the Chipeway. His force at Burlington Heights, when he had been joined by all his detachments, amounted to no more than 1,600 bayonets. The American general sent two of his brigades of in-

fantry, all his riflemen, his light artillery, and 250 dragoons, in pursuit of the British. The situation of General Vincent's small force was, unquestionably, very critical. In their front, a very superior enemy; no support in their rear, on which they could retire; no provisions, supplies, or reinforcements to be expected from York, which the Americans had so lately had possession of; the enemy apparently masters of the lake. Under these circumstances, Colonel Sir John Harvey proposed a night attack, with the bayonet, upon the enemy's troops in their front, and who had advanced as far as Stony Creek, within a few miles of the British position. The attack took place on the night of the 5th of June, and was completely successful. The two American brigadiers, 123 officers and men, and 4 pieces of artillery were taken. The Americans fell back eleven miles to the Forty Mile Creek. From this situation they were dislodged on the 8th, by the guns of a squadron of British gun-boats and schooners, which had sailed from Kingston with a reinforcement of 280 men for the Niagara frontier. This small corps was landed at the Forty Mile Creek, and being added to the advanced guard of General Vincent's column, followed closely the retreat of the Americans. The American troops continued their march to Fort George, in which position the American general

concentrated the whole of his means; calling in his detachments from the Chippeway and Fort Erie, which posts he had occupied as soon as they had been evacuated by the British, on his having effected his passage of the Niagara.

The British force having been augmented by the arrival of an additional regiment from Lower Canada, the advanced posts were pushed on to the Ten Mile Creek and the Beaver Dam. The American troops seem to have lost all spirit of enterprize during the remainder of this campaign, (upon the Niagara frontier and near Fort George,) after the affair of Stony Creek. They suffered themselves to be almost literally blockaded and hemmed in, in the neighbourhood of Fort George, by very inferior numbers. Nothing further of any consequence took place on this frontier until the 1st October, when the American troops were embarked from Fort George, and sailed for Oswego, and from thence to Sackett's Harbour, from whence they were to be employed upon the proposed expedition against Montreal. The care of Fort George and Fort Niagara was entrusted, in the mean while, to 1,500 militia of the State of New York, embodied and armed for the purpose. In the apprehension that Kingston might be the object of attack, and the point against which the American armament from Sackett's Harbour would be directed, two regiments were ordered, from the

British force in the Niagara district, to be immediately forwarded to Kingston. On the 2d October the 49th and 104th regiments were embarked in open boats and commenced their movement round Lake Ontario for Kingston, where they arrived on the 16th of the same month.

On the 9th October the news of the discomfiture of General Proctor's corps upon the Thames, upon the 5th of the same month, reached the Niagara frontier. It was judged proper for the British troops to fall back immediately from the neighbourhood of Fort George upon Burlington Heights, where they were joined by General Proctor and the small remnant of his command. Considering the distance, (about 140 miles,) the difficulty of bringing forward supplies, the impossibility of finding means to subsist an army in the country, and the want of roads through what was then almost a wilderness, the propriety of this measure being so immediately adopted may be questionable. It is asserted that it was even in contemplation, in the moment of alarm, to evacuate the whole of the country above Kingston.

Early in December the British troops re-approached Fort George, the care of which, it has been before stated, had been left to a body of the New York militia. The Americans drew in their piquets and outposts as the British advanced, and, evacuating Fort George on the 12th

December, retreated across the Niagara, having first, in the most wanton and unnecessary manner, burnt all the farm-houses and buildings in the neighbourhood, and also the village, or rather small town, of Newark, close to Fort George. The conduct of the American general upon this occasion was most cruel and disgraceful.

Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond had assumed the command in Upper Canada soon after the evacuation of Fort George. He determined to attempt to take Fort Niagara from the enemy, the capture of which would deprive them of their strong-hold upon this frontier. On the night of the 18th December he caused a select detachment, under the orders of Colonel Murray, of 550 men, to cross the River Niagara three miles above the Fort. This party advanced afterwards in two columns, one of which entered the Fort by the gate which had been left open for the relief of the sentries; the other escalated one of the bastions. The Fort was taken with the loss of eleven men killed and wounded. Its garrison consisted of 400 men; and twenty-seven pieces of ordnance were mounted on the ramparts.

On the same day that Fort Niagara was taken possession of, another detachment of 500 men, accompanied by as many Indians, was ordered to cross the Niagara, and to burn the American town of Lewis Town, opposite to Queen's Town, in re-

taliation for the destruction of Newark. Sir Gordon Drummond, on the 30th and 31st December, caused moreover a brigade and a body of Indians to cross over to Black Rock, and to burn the towns of Black Rock and Buffaloe. These just and retaliatory, although harsh measures, would, it was hoped, prevent a repetition of the cruelties so unnecessarily inflicted on the inhabitants of Newark. The British troops upon the Niagara frontier were now placed in quarters for the winter at Fort Niagara, St. David's, Burlington Heights, and York.

The third operation which the American Government contemplated was, it will be remembered, a combined attack upon Montreal by two corps; one to be assembled at the head of Lake Champlain; the other to descend the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario, after the termination of the proposed enterprizes on that part of the Canadian frontier.

The force of the American corps on Lake Champlain was about 7,000 infantry, ten field-pieces, and 250 cavalry. It was assembled at Burlington, in the state of Vermont, on the east side of Lake Champlain. It was conducted across the Lake by Plattsburg to Chateaugay-four-Corners, where it arrived on the 8th October. It was now evident that the American general meant to advance by the mouth of the Chateaugay River, and to

endeavour to cross the St. Lawrence above the La Chine Rapids, on that part called Lake St. Louis. In possession of the mouth of the Chateaugay, he could cross Lake St. Louis either for Isle Perrot, or the island of Montreal itself, according to the success of the division descending the St. Lawrence. The British general caused, in consequence, that part of the Chateaugay, about twenty-four miles from the Four Corners by which the Americans would have to advance, to be occupied by two companies of Canadian fencibles, four ditto of Canadian voltigeurs, six ditto of Canadian militia, and a party of 170 Indians, (making a total of not quite 1,000 musquets,) under the command of Colonel De Saluberry. On the 26th October the Americans attacked this detachment and endeavoured to dislodge it from its position, but without success. The American general retreated to the Four Corners; and from thence, on the 11th November, fell further back to Plattsburg. Shortly afterwards this corps of the American army was dispersed into winter-quarters.

The affair upon the Chateaugay River is remarkable as having been fought, on the British side, almost entirely by Canadians. The Americans were repulsed by a very inferior number of Canadian militia and troops raised in Canada; thus affording a practical proof of the courage and good disposition of the Canadian, and of the pos-

sibility, to say nothing of the policy, of improving the Canadian militia so as to be fully equal in discipline and instruction to any American troops which may be brought against them at a future opportunity.

The American troops destined to descend the St. Lawrence had, it will be remembered, been embarked at Fort George and Fort Niagara, and sailed for Oswego, and, subsequently, for Sackett's Harbour early in October; having been relieved, upon the Niagara frontier, by a corps of New York militia. At Sackett's Harbour the American general was reinforced by an additional brigade. The total of his force now amounted to 8,000 men under arms.

From Sackett's Harbour the American armament proceeded to Grenadier Island, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. It seems to have been a matter of deliberation whether they ought not, in the first instance, to make themselves masters of Kingston. It, however, having been decided to continue to prosecute the expedition to Montreal, the American boats entered the St. Lawrence on the 5th November. When approaching Fort Wellington, they landed their troops, ammunition, and stores on the American side of the St. Lawrence. The boats passed the fort by night with muffled oars. The American army re-embarked about fourteen miles below Ogdensburg on the

8th. On the 9th November the American armament arrived at the head of the Long Sault. It was here determined to disembark the troops in order to lighten the boats in this rapid part of the river. The American troops landed on the Canadian shore, and on the morning of the 10th one division of their army marched for Cornwall, at the commencement of Lake St. Francis, where it was proposed to re-embark the troops. It was intended, that the flotilla should descend the Sault as soon as intelligence of this division having reached Cornwall should be received. The second division of the army to wait until the departure of the boats, and then to follow the first to Cornwall.

As soon as it was ascertained at Kingston that the American armament had descended the St. Lawrence, it was determined that it should be followed by such a force as could be spared, without too much endangering the capture, by a coup-de-main, of that highly important point: 800 bayonets were all that could, with prudence, be allotted for this service. These troops, under the orders of Colonel Morrison, assisted by a few gun-boats, followed the American flotilla. On the 9th November Colonel Morrison landed at Point Iroquois about thirteen miles below Fort Wellington, on the Canadian side, and advanced towards the Americans. On the 10th he skirmished with an advanced guard of the enemy.

On the 11th the American division, which had remained at the head of the Long Sault, consisting of two brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and six field-pieces, and amounting to certainly 3,500 men, advanced and attacked, at a place called Chrystler's Farm, the small force under the orders of Colonel Morrison. Although the numbers of the Americans were so infinitely superior, and that they were further reinforced by every disposable man from their flotilla, during the action, they were completely repulsed. The British lost 180 officers and men killed and wounded. The Americans lost one gun and had about 100 of their men taken prisoners: 339 was the amount of their killed and wounded. The American troops re-embarked, on the night after the action, and, descending the river four miles, were landed on the American side. The next day they descended the St. Lawrence as far as Barnhart's Island, near Cornwall, where they joined the division which had marched along the Canadian shore to the foot of the Long Sault previous to the action of the 11th. The whole of the American army was here re-embarked and conveyed fifteen miles farther down the St. Lawrence, to the mouth of the Salmon's River, which runs into the St. Lawrence upon the right, or American side of the river. Their flotilla proceeded up this river about seven miles to a place called French Mills, within the

American limits. The American troops remained at the French Mills and Chateaugay-four-Corners, with their head-quarters at Malone, a central village, until the 12th February; when they burnt the flotilla with which they had descended the St. Lawrence, and retired to Plattsburg and Burlington for the winter. Their rear-guard was followed and pressed upon by a detachment of about 1,200 British troops, which was sent across the St. Lawrence from Cornwall to the mouth of the Salmon's River, and advanced nearly to Plattsburg.

Thus of the three operations proposed by the American government for the campaign of 1813, namely, an invasion of the Amherstberg frontier, the capture of the Niagara district, and a combined attack upon Montreal from Lake Champlain and from Lake Ontario, they had only been successful in one; and, fortunately, that was the one of the least consequence with a view to the conquest of Canada. On the Niagara frontier they commenced their operations with judgment and spirit. They passed over to the neighbourhood of Fort George, at once, a large and overwhelming force instead of the petty disembarkations of the preceding year at Queen's Town. They did not, however, follow up their first success so rapidly as, it would appear, they ought to have done. The American army landed at Fort George on

the 27th May. It was not before the 5th June that the corps detached in pursuit of General Vincent reached Stony Creek, only about forty miles from Fort George. This delay seems not only to have been very unnecessary; but, moreover, there appears no good reason why the American general should have sent merely a part of his force after General Vincent. He had no other enemy to contend with, or with respect to whose movements he could have any apprehension. Every British soldier in the district was at Burlington Heights. Every disposable American, under his orders, ought, consequently, to have been brought to that point. If General Vincent's corps had been captured or destroyed, and which, it must be acknowledged, it was in the power of the American general to have done, the Niagara district was lost. When the Americans withdrew their troops from Fort George and proceeded to the head of the St. Lawrence, they were deterred from attacking Kingston in consequence of the reinforcements sent from the Niagara district for the protection of that important point. If the British Niagara division had been no longer in existence, of course no reinforcements could have been forwarded to Kingston. Kingston in possession of the Americans, no troops could have been detached to hang upon the rear of the American flotilla in its progress down the St. Law-

rence. The Americans, unquestionably, in that case, could have proceeded down the St. Lawrence as far as the end of Lake St. Francis. In the reflections upon Lord Amherst's campaign of 1760, and his descent of the St. Lawrence, in that year, in his progress towards Montreal; the impolicy of selecting, and the difficulties attending such a line of operations, have been already fully explained. Whether the Americans would have been able to have proceeded from Lake St. Francis to Lake St. Louis, and to have joined, at the Isle Perrot, the corps meant to advance by the Chateaugay River, must have depended upon various contingencies. Here, between Lake St. Francis and Lake St. Louis, they might, and probably would, have been stopped, for some time at any rate. The preservation of the Niagara district and of Kingston may, however, with the strictest justice, be fairly attributed to the attack upon the enemy at Stony Creek. The nature of the war seems instantly to have changed after that most manly and energetic affair; and the campaign, on that frontier, terminated in the capture of the American strong-hold (Fort Niagara), and the destruction of all their towns and villages, together with the stores, provisions, and ordnance they had collected, in that part of the country, for the further prosecution of the war.

The proposed line of advance for the American

corps from Champlain by Four Corners to the mouth of the Chateaugay River was judicious, avoiding the obstructions of the Isle-aux-Noix and St. John's, and affording a harbour (the mouth of the Chateaugay) to receive the requisite boats and embark the troops for the passage of the Lake St. Louis. It may, however, be remarked that the Americans committed upon this occasion the same error as, it has already been observed, may be laid to the charge of the British government in their plan for General Burgoyne's march from the head of Lake Champlain to Albany, namely, that of making the desired result of an important operation depend upon the success of all its constituent or component parts. In the present instance, had the American corps, ordered to advance by Chateaugay, forced its way to the mouth of that river, its success would have been of no avail unless the armament descending the St. Lawrence should have been equally fortunate, and (after having reached the Isle Perrot) been able to send boats and craft for the conveyance of the Chateaugay division to the same place. And, on the other hand, if the corps meant to approach Montreal, by the St. Lawrence, had arrived safe in Lake St. Louis, (notwithstanding the dangers of the navigation between Lake St. Francis and Lake St. Louis, and the opposition it would unquestionably have met with at this important

point,) it was not of sufficient strength to have acted against Montreal without the co-operation of the division from the Chateaugay River. Thus the success of either corps must have been nugatory, without the same good fortune attended them both. It may perhaps rather appear, upon a careful investigation of the subject, that this part of the American plan of operations, namely, the combined movement against Montreal, was very loosely arranged; and that, had the corps which descended the St. Lawrence advanced as far as Lake St. Louis, (after the retreat of the division meant to advance to the mouth of the Chateaugay,) it would have found itself in a lake surrounded by an armed and hostile population, and having no chance of safety but in the complete subjugation of the Island of Montreal; to attempt which its force was perfectly inadequate. The American armament never could have left Lake St. Louis. It could not have descended the La Chine Rapids. It could not have reascended the Cascades, Split Rock, and Coteau-du-Lac falls. The American general would have had no retreat but by the Chateaugay River. This was already in possession of the Canadian militia and other provincial troops. Checked in front, followed and harassed in the rear, as he of course would have been; his boats and stores necessarily abandoned to the British; the ter-

mination of this expedition, had it proceeded lower down the St. Lawrence than the mouth of the Salmon River, in all probability would have been even more unfortunate to the American arms than it actually was.

In the early part of this campaign, after the capture of York, and whilst the American troops were employed upon the Niagara district, the care of Sackett's Harbour was understood to be left to a small force. The British projected, in consequence, an attack from Kingston upon this very valuable depôt and head-quarters of the American army, upon the possession and security of which the success of all their operations upon Lake Ontario seemed to depend. About 800 men were embarked at Kingston on the 27th May, and landed on the morning of the 29th upon Horse Island, a projecting peninsula about two thousand yards to the westward of Sackett's Harbour, and communicating by a narrow isthmus with the main land. The British troops proceeded from Horse Island to the main land, and had gained the rear of the town and dockyard when they were ordered to re-embark. The British casualties were severe, there having been 261 officers and men killed and wounded. The force employed upon this occasion does, certainly, seem to have been by no means adequate to the object to be attained. Whether a further perseverance in the

attempt would have been successful, it is impossible to say; but as the destruction of the naval and military stores, of the ship of war on the stocks, and of several schooners in the harbour would have very much crippled the enemy's means, it is to be lamented that the attempt was not made with a force of sufficient magnitude to have ensured success. A futile and unavailing effort could only give confidence to the enemy, and had certainly better not have been attempted.

1814.

The reverses the Americans had experienced, in the latter part of the preceding year, on the Niagara frontier; the complete failure of the combined movement (by the St. Lawrence and the Chateaugay) upon Montreal; the check their best organized corps had met with on the Chateaugay River, from Canadian troops alone, had opened the eyes of thinking men of all parties in the United States, and showed them that their government was expending the strength and treasure of their country in attempting to conquer an immense and very populous province, not only defended by the arms of Great Britain, but with the majority of the inhabitants of which they could

have no community of language, feelings, or interests. The leading members of the American Congress, who voted for the war, seem to have been strangely deceived as to the state of the public mind and opinion in the Canadas. It was conceived that the American flag had only to be shown to be followed, and that the British authority and influence was confined to the barracks and military posts in the Canadas. The Canadian militia, however, uniformly behaved well. The only partisans or well-wishers to the Americans were a few discontented emigrants from England, who were dissatisfied without any reason, and who, probably, as no form of government could have pleased them, would have been equally troublesome under that of the United States. There were fortunately but very few settlers of this description. The great majority of the Upper Canadians were happy, loyal, and contented. They appear to have been perfectly aware of the superior advantages they enjoy as British subjects, to what their situation would be as members of the American Union. In Lower Canada, which includes all the Montreal district, there is an hereditary hostile feeling towards the United States, of which the American government seems to have been very little aware. Not a single Lower Canadian militia-man was known to desert to the enemy, during the three years the

war continued. The American Congress began now to be aware of their error in so hastily entering into a contest, from which no advantages could be gained. The nature and object of the war changed in consequence. In this campaign, the American government no longer looked forward to the conquest of Canada, or projected any combined movement against Montreal, as a preliminary measure to the complete possession of the province. It was proposed, by renewing the invasion of the Niagara frontier, to prevent the British from detaching towards Amherstberg and attempting to re-occupy that district. The British still held the Island of Michilimakinak, at the entrance of Lake Michigan, and which interfered with the American trade (as already explained in page 106) in that quarter. It was conceived this island must fall of itself this summer, for want of provisions, if the British did not retake Amherstberg. It was further intended that the corps at Plattsburg should make a demonstration upon the Montreal frontier, afterwards move rapidly by land to Sackett's Harbour, where it was to be joined by the troops from the Niagara district; the troops from the Niagara district to be brought to Sackett's Harbour, (by the Lake Ontario squadron,) after they had taken Fort George and Fort Niagara, in the latter of which they were to leave a garrison. The whole

of the force thus assembled at Sackett's Harbour to proceed against Kingston. Thus the re-capture of the Island of Michilimakinak, the retaking of Fort Niagara, and an attack upon Kingston, were the three objects to be attempted in this campaign by the American arms, and towards the accomplishment of which all their movements were to be directed. This humble plan, compared with the views of conquest exhibited in those of the two preceding years, sufficiently attests the change of sentiment and opinion in the leading men of the American government.

In the Amherstberg district, no hostilities took place this campaign. The Americans remained in quiet possession. The British did not, however, neglect their small garrison at Michilimakinak. No supplies or stores could be forwarded by Lake Erie. An active and intelligent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowal, conducted sixty-five soldiers and twenty-five seamen, with a supply of provisions and ammunition from York to Lake Simcoe, and from thence to Nottawassaga Creek on Lake Huron. Here he embarked his party in twenty-four open row-boats, and boldly ventured across Lake Huron. He effected his passage in twenty-five days, and landed at Michilimakinak on the 18th May. The Americans, who had no idea of the possibility of the post being supplied by this route, had calculated upon the surrender of the

island for want of provisions. They now sent a detachment of 900 men from Detroit to take possession of Michilimakinak. The Americans landed on the 4th August, but were repulsed by the garrison. Two armed schooners, each carrying a twenty-four pounder, and which had convoyed the American troops, were even boarded and captured.

On the Niagara frontier hostilities did not commence before the 3d July, on which day two brigades of the American troops crossed the Niagara from Buffaloe and Black Rock, and landed, one about a mile above, and the other the same distance below Fort Erie. Fort Erie was, contrary to expectation, immediately surrendered. It had been calculated that this post would have been defended for a sufficient length of time to allow the troops, charged with the defence of the district, to assemble. The British force upon this part of the Niagara frontier consisted of three battalions, a troop of dragoons, a detachment of artillery, 300 militia, and as many Indians. Another battalion and 300 more of the militia were at Forts George and Niagara at the other extremity of the line. An additional regiment was on its march from York, and joined at Chippeway on the morning of the 15th July.

The Chippeway River runs into the Niagara a short way above the Falls. It is a broad deep

river, and affords an excellent position to retire upon and to oppose an enemy advancing from Fort Erie towards Fort George. It can only be turned by making a considerable circuit. Behind this river the British troops, with the exception of the garrisons at Fort George and Niagara, were assembled, with an advanced piquet at Street's Creek, a rivulet about a mile and a half from the Chippeway, flowing parallel to it and running equally into the Niagara. The Americans dislodged the piquet upon Street's Creek, and having repaired the bridge, crossed the rivulet on the evening of the 4th July, and encamped opposite to the British troops behind the Chippeway. Major-General Riall, who commanded the British troops, having been joined by an additional regiment on the morning of the 5th July, thought himself sufficiently strong to leave his position and attack the American corps in his front. He had rather better than 2,000 men under arms, supported by one howitzer and two travelling twenty-four pounders. He attacked the Americans about three o'clock in the afternoon. He was repulsed with the loss of 500 officers and men killed and wounded; and, in consequence, having first reinforced the garrisons of Fort George and Fort Niagara, he retreated to the Twenty Mile Creek on Lake Ontario, on his way to Burlington Heights, which position he proposed to occupy until he could be reinforced.

The Americans advanced along the Niagara as far as Queen's Town, from whence they pushed forward strong patrols towards Fort George. On the 24th July they returned from Queen's Town towards the Chippeway, and encamped on its right bank, in order to protect a convoy of provisions they expected to be forwarded from Fort Schlosser on the American side of the Niagara, opposite to the mouth of the Chippeway. General Riall, who had not retreated farther than the Twenty Mile Creek, where he had been reinforced by an additional regiment, and the flank companies of another, had, during these movements of the enemy, re-advanced to the Fifteen Mile Creek at the head of about 2,000 men. At the Fifteen Mile Creek, hearing of the retreat of the American corps to the Chippeway, he immediately detached about 900 bayonets to the high ground, about two miles and a half from the Chippeway close to the Falls, as a corps of observation to ascertain what the enemy was about. This detachment marched all night; and, on the morning of the 25th, took up a position at a place called Lundy's Lane, at right angles to the road between Forts George and Erie, and on the highest ground of the Queen's Town Hill. This small corps remained here perfectly quiet until the afternoon of the same day, when it was attacked by an American brigade, detached from the camp upon the

Chippeway for the purpose. This attack was shortly afterwards followed and supported by three additional brigades with seven field-pieces, being the whole of the American force from the Chippeway. The American general had crossed the Niagara with only two brigades on the 3d July, but he since had been reinforced.

Major-General Riall had followed his advanced corps, with the remainder of his troops from the Fifteen Mile Creek, on the morning of the 25th. On approaching the Queen's Town Heights he found the detachment engaged, as already explained, with very superior numbers at Lundy's Lane. He directed the officer commanding to retreat to Queen's Town, and ordered the column, consisting of the remainder of his force, to move upon Queen's Town instead of Queen's Town Heights as originally intended.

On the very morning of the day when these transactions took place, Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond arrived from York at Fort Niagara, having the 89th regiment and some small detachments with him. He immediately landed and proceeded up the Niagara to Queen's Town. From Queen's Town he advanced towards Lundy's Lane, where he arrived at six o'clock in the evening. He found the troops who had been engaged, retreating according to the orders issued, as already explained. They were immediately counter-

marched, and the whole were formed into line on the crest of the hill, which the enemy had fortunately not taken possession of. In ten minutes more this ground could not have been acquired without a struggle. The whole of the British force now assembled was not more than 1,800 bayonets, assisted by five guns. In this situation they were warmly engaged with the enemy, in a very arduous conflict, until nine o'clock. At nine the remainder of General Riall's corps, which had been ordered to Queen's Town, with a view to the retreat, but had since been sent for by Sir Gordon Drummond, arrived. This reinforcement, although the men were extremely fatigued, having been under arms, and marching for nine hours, was of the greatest consequence. It amounted to about 1,250 additional bayonets, and had two guns. The British force was now in all rather more than 3,000 men under arms, and was supported with seven field-pieces. It was half past eleven before the Americans gave way, leaving two field-pieces in the hands of the British. This appears to have been the severest action fought during the war. It commenced about five in the afternoon, and did not cease until half past eleven. The British lost 878 officers and men killed and wounded; the Americans 854.

The American general left his camp upon the Chippeway, and breaking down the bridges, re-

treated to Fort Erie on the 27th July. He immediately commenced to strengthen the works. The British followed, and invested Fort Erie. It was not before the 13th August that they were able to open their battery. On the night of the 14th, Sir Gordon Drummond attempted to carry Fort Erie by escalade. The British were, however, repulsed with the loss of 905 officers and men killed, wounded, and missing; 540 of whom were supposed to have been blown up by the accidental explosion of some powder in a bastion of which they had acquired possession.

Sir Gordon Drummond, having been reinforced by two regiments, continued to blockade Fort Erie. On the 17th September the Americans attempted a sortie in force. They were repulsed, but not without a severe loss on both sides. The British had 609 officers and men killed and wounded; the Americans 510.

On the 21st September, Sir Gordon Drummond raised the investment of Fort Erie and returned to the position of the Chippeway. On the 5th November the Americans evacuated Fort Erie, and retired across the Niagara. On the 10th December, the British troops and the embodied militia of the Niagara district were distributed into winter-quarters.

The American corps opposite the Montreal frontier (which had its head-quarters at Platts-

burg on Lake Champlain) was put in movement early in March, in order, agreeably to their plan of operations for this campaign, as explained in a preceding page, to draw the attention of the British general in chief to the country between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu; and prevent his augmenting his force at Kingston, or in the Niagara district. The strength of this division of the enemy's troops was about 5,000 men under arms. It advanced to Champlain Town, on the River Chaizie, close to the frontier. The British occupied the Isle-aux-Noix upon their left; a mill upon the La Colle River, in their centre; and had a strong piquet upon the Burton-ville road, upon their right. The Isle-aux-Noix was fortified and held by a garrison of 550 seamen and soldiers. The mill upon the La Colle was occupied by a field-officer and 180 men. The Burton-ville road was watched by two companies of Canadian troops. On the 12th March, about mid-day, the Americans advanced upon the La Colle mill, driving in the piquets. They were not, however, able to make any impression upon the mill itself, which was a strong stone building, and from whence the British kept up a most destructive fire of musquetry upon them. The Americans brought up a couple of guns to destroy the mill. Two companies were sent from the Isle-aux-Noix, and the same number came from Burton-ville to the assistance of the

troops in La Colle mill. Repeated attempts were made, after the arrival of these reinforcements, to drive the enemy from his guns, by charging him with the bayonet. These attacks, although unsuccessful, prevented the steady and full use of his artillery. The Americans retired in the afternoon, having lost 154 officers and men killed and wounded. The British lost 64.

The American troops, very soon after this affair at La Colle mill, were withdrawn from the Montreal frontier, and moved to Sackett's Harbour with a view to the proposed expedition against Kingston. Small garrisons were left at Plattsburg; Burlington: and at Vergennes, three bays or harbours on Lake Champlain, selected for the construction of vessels of war for the defence of Lake Champlain. The enterprize against the piquet at La Colle mill was the only hostile movement undertaken by the enemy upon this part of the frontier, in this campaign.

Thus of the three operations contemplated by the American government, to have been carried into execution in the summer of 1814, it would appear that they had not been able to accomplish one. They were foiled at Michilimakinak. Although, after the battle at Street's Creek, they had, for a short time, had the superiority upon the Niagara frontier, they had not been able to keep it long enough, or with such decided advantages,

as to enable them to retake Fort Niagara. And, as the plan of the expedition against Kingston had been arranged so as to be contingent upon the operations upon the Niagara frontier, it had never been attempted. The troops from that district, not only were never disposable, but the forts at the mouth of the Niagara River, having been constantly in the possession of the British, the American army had not only no point of embarkation, from which they could proceed to the rendezvous at Sackett's Harbour, but were unable, in fact, to have any direct communication with their fleet.

In the course of this campaign, the British undertook two operations against the American possessions. The first was against Oswego on Lake Ontario. The second against Plattsburg on Lake Champlain. It will be observed in the accounts of the military transactions in the Seven Years' War, that Oswego was the port upon Lake Ontario, to which the British in those days attached the greatest consequence. It had by the Mohawk River, the Oneida Lake, and the Onandago River, a tolerable water-communication with Albany, at the head of the Hudson or North River. Sackett's Harbour is more capacious, deeper, and more secure; and was, in consequence, selected by the American government for their naval station upon Lake Ontario in 1812. Sackett's Harbour has,

however, the disadvantage of not having any retired or interior water-communication, by which naval stores can be received. Heavy articles requiring water-carriage must, in the first instance, be transmitted to Oswego; and at Oswego, be reshipped and forwarded by the Lake to Sackett's Harbour. The distance from Oswego to Sackett's Harbour is about sixty miles. A knowledge of these circumstances, and a presumption that, in consequence, a considerable quantity of naval stores would be collected at Oswego, gave rise to the idea of attempting, by a coup-de-main, to take possession of Oswego. A detachment of about 1,000 troops, assisted by 200 seamen with pikes, sailed from Kingston on the 4th, and were landed under the fire of the American batteries at Oswego, on the 6th May. Such stores as were found were burnt or destroyed; and the expedition returned the next day to Kingston. The British lost eighty-two officers and men in killed and wounded. The inconvenience to the enemy was not so great as was expected; as the principal dépôt was found to be situated inland, upon the Oneida Lake. The Americans, by this arrangement, avoided the error the British had been guilty of in the year 1756 at Oswego; upon which occasion, it will be remembered, the Marquis de Montcalm took Oswego; and burnt the British stores and provisions, collected for their proposed expedition against Fort

Niagara; an event which could have been prevented, by placing the depôt upon Lake Oneida.

The second offensive operation was undertaken against Plattsburg upon Lake Ontario.

As soon as hostilities ceased in Europe several very efficient and excellent brigades were forwarded from Bourdeaux, from the Duke of Wellington's army to Canada. They arrived in the St. Lawrence in July and August. One brigade was sent to Kingston, for the security of that important post. The remainder were encamped and cantoned in front of Montreal, on the south side of the St. Lawrence, and between that River and the Richelieu.

On Lake Champlain the Americans had a ship, a brig, a schooner, a sloop, and ten gun-boats, mounting eighty-three guns. These vessels had all been built either at Plattsburg, Burlington, or at Vergennes; which places were, more or less, secured by batteries, under the protection of which they could retire in case of a superior British squadron making its appearance on the Lake. The British vessels consisted of a ship, a brig, two sloops and twelve gun-boats, carrying ninety guns. The Isle-aux-Noix afforded them an harbour in case of necessity. The naval strength, and the naval arrangements, seem to have been pretty equal on both sides.

The British General, Sir George Prevost,

marched at the head of three brigades, amounting to 11,000 bayonets, with a respectable proportion of artillery, and took possession, on the 3d September, of the American town of Champlain on the Chaizie, from which the American troops were withdrawn as he approached. He quitted Champlain on the 4th, and arrived in front of Plattsburg on the 6th September. The American squadron was at anchor off Plattsburg.

The River Saranac flows from west to east, and runs into Lake Champlain at Plattsburg. This river is not fordable at Plattsburg. Parallel to the Saranac, at some little distance in its front on the Canadian side, is a small stream called the Dead Creek. This rivulet can perhaps be forded; but it is deep and muddy. There was a bridge over it. The town of Plattsburg (which consists of merely a few wooden houses) stands on both sides of the Saranac. The Americans had occupied the south bank, which is higher than the north, and constructed three redoubts and some other field-works for the defence of this position; which is certainly also good in itself.

The British general did not immediately attack the enemy. He waited until a favourable wind should allow the British vessels to advance and co-operate with him, by bringing the American squadron to action at the same time. In this respect, it is conceived, he committed a very great

error. It was not before the 11th, that the British ships hove in sight. The Americans had consequently four complete days to strengthen their position. The march from Champlain to in front of Plattsburg had already occupied three days. To an active and energetic enemy, particularly expert with the spade and the axe, this delay was invaluable. The best of the American troops had been sent to Sackett's Harbour, and the Niagara frontier. It was known that there was only one brigade of their disposable force on this part of the frontier. The militia kept, however, flocking in, and by being allowed sufficient time, they soon materially strengthened and improved their defences. Every day's delay added to the force and numbers of the enemy. To construct, as also to defend these entrenchments, the American militia-man was fully equal to the soldier who had been longer under arms.

It has been remarked, by those who either advised or have approved of this delay, that if the British army had taken possession of Plattsburg and its batteries, for the defence of the anchorage, before the British squadron was abreast of the American vessels, the enemy would probably have quitted Plattsburg, and if unequal or unwilling to fight the British ships, might have retreated up the Otter creek at Vergennes, and thus the contest must necessarily have been prolonged. It is

however, to be observed, that the same wind which the Americans would have required to take them from Plattsburg towards Vergennes, would have brought the British from the north of the lake towards Plattsburg. The American squadron did not, and could not remain off Plattsburg, to fight the British ships, in consequence of having Plattsburg to retire to if defeated in the action. They could have no idea when the British general would attack the place. To have determined to remain off Plattsburg to fight, under the idea that they had Plattsburg to retire to, before which, at that moment, was a superior British army, would have been very extraordinary reasoning on the part of the officers of the American squadron. It may rather be assumed, that upon finding a powerful British armament invading their country by Lake Champlain, they determined to do their duty, by bringing the naval part of it to action as soon as they could. They naturally anchored off Plattsburg, in communication with their army. It however by no means follows, that the American squadron was to have retired, had the American army been beaten and dislodged. On the contrary, as the further advance from Plattsburg of the British army must have depended entirely on the question of the naval superiority of the lake, it would have been the business of the American commodore to have endeavoured to acquire

that superiority as soon as he possibly could, and which was only to be done by obtaining a victory. It appears, from these observations, that having conducted his army to Plattsburg, the British general ought to have attacked and carried the American position, on the south of the Saranac, without delay. By waiting four days, in the hopes that a naval victory would be acquired at the same time, he added to the difficulties his troops would have to encounter, and allowed the fortunate result of two operations (distinct and unconnected in their nature) to depend upon the contingency of the success of one, and that the most uncertain of the two.

The British squadron came in sight of Plattsburg on the 11th September, and immediately attacked the American ships. The British troops were put in motion at the same time, and one brigade had effected the passage of the Saranac, by ascending that river and fording the stream, when it was recalled in consequence of the defeat and capture of the British ships. The British army retreated the same evening, and was soon after dispersed between the Isle-aux-Noix, St. John's, Chambly, and La Prairie. No further hostile movements took place on the Montreal frontier.

Thus ended the campaign of 1814, and shortly afterwards, by the signature of the treaty of peace at Ghent, a war was concluded, into which the

leading men of the American Congress had unquestionably hurried their country, under very erroneous and mistaken notions as to the feelings and wishes of the inhabitants of both the Canadas. In the conduct of each of the three campaigns, the American government showed a considerable want of military knowledge and arrangement. In the first, their efforts were feeble and languid. In the second, they evinced more energy in their invasion of the Niagara frontier; and, had their general followed up his success with more activity, and had he not experienced the check he met with at Stony Creek, the events, as far as Upper Canada was concerned, might have been very different. The injudicious nature of the movement by the St. Lawrence has already been fully expatiated upon, both in the account of the campaigns of 1760, and that of 1813. If Lord Amherst's conduct should be judged to have been imprudent, what must be thought of that of the Americans, who attempted to follow his footsteps, leaving a British force behind them, in the Niagara district, and also at Kingston? In the campaign of 1814, the American government appear to have had no fixed object in view. The recapture of Fort Niagara and the proposed attack upon Kingston were never attempted. It is, however, but justice to the American soldier to observe that he seems to have manifested great

perseverance, steadiness and courage, and to have wonderfully improved in the last year of the war. The American troops at Street's Creek, at Lundy's Lane, and at the sortie at Fort Erie, appear to have shown all the discipline, as well as spirit of enterprize, that could be wished for. The failure of the British attack upon Sackett's Harbour (as it was upon a small scale and made with but, comparatively speaking, a handful of troops) will probably have no great influence in future wars. The retreat, however, from Plattsburg is an event deeply to be lamented, as to its effects upon the *morale* of the American troops. The regiments at Plattsburg were known to be among the very best in the British army, and to have distinguished themselves, under their great leader, in the Peninsula and in France. These men, the Americans will not easily forget, they have seen fall back before them. As confidence gives strength, it will, in consequence, require redoubled exertions, and unfortunately, a commensurate loss, in any future attempt, which may hereafter be necessary, to dislodge an American corps from a position. The 500 men saved at Plattsburg will, probably, cost Great Britain 5,000 upon some future occasion.

In consequence of the peace, one of the articles of which provided for a mutual restitution of conquered territories or possessions, the Island of Michilimakinak and Fort Niagara were restored

to the government of the United States. Commissioners were also to be appointed, on each side, to arrange amicably the exact limits of the frontier between his Majesty's provinces and the adjoining American districts.

The peace was signed at Ghent by the British and American plenipotentiaries on the 24th of December, 1814.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS.

As the great use of the study of history and of the knowledge of past events is to enable us to profit of the experience and to avoid the errors of those who have gone before us, the following Reflections, arising from a careful and anxious consideration of the contents of the preceding pages, may not appear irrelevant to the subject. As nurseries for our seamen, as markets for our manufactures, as closely connected with our naval superiority, and with our existence as a great power, it is conceived the importance of his Majesty's North American provinces need not here be discussed, nor the propriety of considering them as component parts of the British empire. Assuming it for granted, that there can be but one opinion as to the policy of preventing such growing means and resources, as these colonies afford, from being added to the already great power and population of America, it will

be observed, with pleasure, that there is but little (in comparison with the important objects in view it may be said very little indeed) to be done.

QUEBEC.

The fortifications of Quebec, bad and neglected as they were, have already twice preserved the possession of Canada to the crown of Great Britain. After the loss of the battle of Sillery, in 1760, General Murray would have been obliged to lay down his arms had he not had the works of Quebec to retire to, until he could receive reinforcements from England. In 1775 the Americans were masters of all Canada but Quebec. Quebec was the only place in Canada, where the British flag was flying, when the armament arrived in May, 1776, from England. The improvement of the fortifications of Quebec, and the construction of the citadel (now in progress,) may, consequently, be esteemed most judicious and provident measures.

MONTREAL.

In the foregoing pages it may be observed, that in every plan for the invasion of Canada, from so far back even as that projected in 1711 (in the reign of Queen Anne) to the last attempt by the Americans

in 1813, the idea of advancing by Lake Champlain upon Montreal has been uniformly entertained. The necessity of a fortress upon Montreal Island is thus pointed out by the concurring testimony of every military man, who has projected an attack upon Canada. What the enemy wishes to acquire, it must be our interest to preserve. Montreal is, in fact, the key and the capital of Canada. It is the centre of her commerce, and (what is an unusual circumstance in considering countries with a view to their defence) it is not less important in a military point of view. It will, moreover, be of still greater consequence when the back water-communication with Kingston is completed. A fortress at Montreal seems, therefore, a primary object.

Isle-aux-Noix, St. John's, and Chambly appear to have been constantly held, and considered necessary, for the defence of Canada, as advanced posts on the approach from Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence. At present, that steam navigation has been introduced on Lake Champlain, is so general upon the Hudson, and that a canal has been cut to communicate from Albany to Whitehall, (formerly Skeensburgh,) the propriety of having respectable forts (however small) at these three places is even more evident, as an hostile movement upon Montreal can be made with so much more rapidity. If properly constructed

and carefully guarded, they must detain an invading enemy on the right or southern side of the St. Lawrence; give time to prepare for his reception at Montreal; and may (if their defence is combined with judicious military movements) be the cause of even keeping the war entirely upon the frontier. To ensure the practicability of the military movements alluded to in the preceding sentence, the power of passing troops from the left to the right of the St. Lawrence must be secured. When the Americans in 1775 besieged Fort St. John, General Carleton was not able to attempt to relieve it, owing to the enemy having possession of the right or southern bank of the St. Lawrence. The propriety of securing an harbour opposite to Montreal, and fortifying it beforehand, so that, in time of war, we may have a tête-de-pont ready to receive a corps destined to act against the enemy, (whilst employed in the sieges of Fort St. John, Chambly, or the Isle-aux-Noix,) or to which the troops and militia, from that side of the river, could retire, if pressed by an overwhelming force, is thus pointed out by the history of past events, as well as by the evident propriety of the measure. The mouth of the Chateaugay River offers every facility that could be wished for such a work.

If these measures should be adopted on the Montreal frontier, let us consider what would be

our situation on this the most important, and, at present, confessedly most vulnerable and accessible part of Canada. We would have a respectable fortress, on high and advantageous ground, in the rear of a broad, deep, and rapid river, and which could not be approached by an enemy until he had previously captured two out of three of the smaller works on his side of the St. Lawrence. These works would, of course, be sufficiently strong to compel him to break ground and besiege them in form. We should, moreover, by the tête-de-pont at Chateaugay, have the advantage of being able to interrupt these sieges, and if there was a sufficient disposable force, it would be in our power to manœuvre on either side of the river according to circumstances. Surely every person of reading and reflection, without necessarily being a military man, can judge of the difficulties an enemy would, under such arrangements, have to encounter. When it is, moreover, remembered how short the season is in Canada for military operations, it may safely and confidently be asserted that nothing but the grossest negligence on our part could give the assailants a prospect of success.

KINGSTON.

To any person who has read with attention the

preceding pages it can hardly be necessary to expatiate upon the importance of Kingston. It is not only the port, naval station, and dockyard of Lake Ontario, but, situated at the commencement of the St. Lawrence, (if it does not effectually prevent the entrance into that river of an hostile flotilla,) it can contain and protect an armament to be sent in pursuit, and, as was done by Colonel Morrison's brigade in 1813, to hang upon and discomfit the enemy's rear. The impolicy and apparent error of such a line of operations, as the descent of the St. Lawrence, with a view to an attack upon Montreal, has been already explained in discussing General Amherst's campaign of 1760, and that of the Americans in 1813. All these reasons acquire considerable additional force if we suppose Kingston judiciously fortified. If we also look forward to the completion of the Rideau Canal, it may be asked what enemy could think seriously of invading any part of the frontier between these two places, or, excepting he was in very great force indeed, would undertake the siege of either, connected together, as they would be, by a retired water-communication; capable, in consequence, of affording to each other mutual aid and assistance, and from either of which troops might be detached upon his rear, flank, or front, as occasion might require. If Kingston is fortified, and the Rideau

Canal completed, it will not be necessary to have a single gun or soldier upon the whole extent of frontier from Montreal to Kingston. The militia, properly organized, may certainly be considered equal to the defence of their own farms and villages, against all predatory attacks, which is the only species of warfare to be apprehended, it would appear, under the circumstances as supposed upon the St. Lawrence.

LAKE ONTARIO.

The defence of that part of the Canadian frontier bathed by Lake Ontario must be naval. There seems no good reason why we should not maintain a naval superiority on this lake. If that superiority was dependant upon the comparative extent of commercial shipping, it would be ours decidedly; as the sloops and merchant vessels employed in navigating Lake Ontario and in carrying produce from the rich and well cultivated country at the western end of the lake are British. The Americans have but little traffic on Lake Ontario. On the other hand, the British flag is not much seen on Lake Erie, by which water the Americans communicate with Lake Michigan. The command, however, of Lake Ontario, for many years, can have nothing to do with the commerce of the lake, as the crews of all the craft

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and vessels on the lake, Americans as well as British, would not man a frigate. That power which has the best naval establishment, and is the most active in forwarding seamen and supplies, must command Lake Ontario. Our harbour and naval establishment at Kingston are very good indeed, and infinitely beyond what the Americans possess at Sackett's Harbour. There cannot be a finer basin in the world than the Bay of Quinté. When the Rideau Canal is completed, there will be great facilities for forwarding stores to Kingston. We have, moreover, Burlington Bay and York Harbour for sloops and small vessels to run into. The Americans have only Sackett's Harbour, and the port of Oswego, which last is dangerous and unsafe. It seems that we will have ourselves to blame if we lose the command of the lake. If, from unfortunate circumstances, the Americans should be for a time in superior force upon Lake Ontario; it is consolatory to think that whilst we hold Kingston, we have in our own hands, as experience has shown in the late war, the power of creating a navy, and of resuming the command whenever we think proper to make the requisite exertion. This consideration ought not to be lost sight of, in addition to the many other powerful reasons for fortifying Kingston. It is also to be remembered that the Americans have no water-communication as yet










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with Sackett's Harbour excepting by Oswego, which necessitates a voyage of sixty miles upon Lake Ontario, exposed to interruption by the weather, as well as by our vessels in time of war. In this respect, when the Rideau Canal will be completed, Kingston will afford great advantages.

YORK. *Toronto.*

From Kingston to Niagara there is no point which, with a view to the general defence of Canada, requires to be held. The Americans took York twice during the last war. As the seat of government, it may perhaps be thought advisable that it ought to be secure from insult; and in the event of the Americans having the temporary command of the lake, York would be useful for the protection of small craft and coasting vessels sailing from the Bay of Quinté with supplies for the Niagara frontier. For these reasons it may be judged proper to construct a small work at York. As experience has, however, shown that the capture of York would not materially advance the conquest of Canada, whatever fortifications may be determined upon for York, may, consequently, it would appear, be postponed without injury to the King's service, until the more essential and commanding points are secured.

NIAGARA.

The fertile district of Niagara was very little known, either in the Seven Years' War, or in that of the American Revolution. In the years 1812, 1813, and 1814, it was, however, the scene of some very severe conflicts. In 1812, it was preserved by the firmness and decision of General Brock. In 1813, a most gallant and energetic attack made at Stony Creek by night upon an American corps of almost five times their numbers, by a small British force, checked the enemy's career of conquest, and prevented the evacuation of almost all Upper Canada. In 1814, the Americans again attempted the invasion of this district, and it was not without a very serious struggle at Lundy's Lane, that the general officer who then commanded, Sir Gordon Drummond, was able to compel them to retreat. The necessity of not leaving so valuable a district open to the attempts of the Americans, and its defence to the chance of our being able to allot, in time of war, a sufficient number of troops for its protection, point out the necessity of constructing a respectable fortress on this part of the frontier.

Should such a measure be adopted, it will give confidence to the inhabitants, who, when called out as militia during the late war, uniformly behaved well, and showed great zeal and firmness.

It will moreover compel the Americans, if they ever again invade the province, to come in force and prepared for an important siege. These last advantages may not appear so evident to any person who may read these pages who is not a military man. To such it may be necessary to explain, that if, by the construction of this and the other proposed fortresses, we can cause a war in America to be more assimilated to a war in Europe,—if we can force the Americans to move in large corps and to undertake heavy sieges, we shall have every prospect of beating them. In long and harassing marches through the woods and uncultivated parts of the country; in a war of posts and skirmishes, their knowledge of the country and habits of life will give them every advantage. It ought to be our policy, as it is evidently our interest, to avoid all petty warfare; to oppose to the enemy's desultory attacks, as much as possible, the militia and provincial corps; thereby encouraging a spirit of rivalry and contention; and to keep the regular troops more in reserve, occupying the important points and military features of the country. By such arrangements the regular regiments will be assembled together in greater numbers, to the advantage of their discipline, the maintenance of their efficiency, and to their consequent possession of every facility for acting with vigour when required.

AMHERSTBERG DISTRICT.

Although the campaign in 1813 commenced on this frontier so early as on the 18th of January, (on which day the Americans dislodged the British troops from French Town,) yet it was not until the 5th of October that the small British force, allotted for the defence of this remote part of the province of Upper Canada, was compelled to evacuate it after the battle at the Moravian Town upon the Thames. Had the British troops had a fortress on the Thames containing a sufficient supply of provisions and ammunition to which they could have retired, the Americans would not have been able (notwithstanding their command of Lake Erie) to have over-run the district of the Thames. The militia, supported by such a work, would have continued their exertions to the last. The Indians, who only quitted the British when they commenced their retreat, would, in all probability, not have left them, as the troops would have had no occasion to retire. The British kept the field sufficiently long to have prevented the enemy from laying siege to any fortress during that season. The contest in the Amherstberg district would, consequently, not have been concluded in 1813; and the Americans would have been foiled in the only operation in which they were successful.

These considerations, added to the beauty and fertility of the country; the loyalty and good disposition of its inhabitants; its fast improving state; and the facilities it will, consequently, hereafter afford for an invasion by the Thames, seem to point out the propriety of placing a respectable work, capable of serving as a point-d'appui to the troops and militia of the district, upon this river.

BOUNDARY

BETWEEN LOWER CANADA AND THE BRITISH
PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK, WITH
THE STATE OF MAINE.

It will be observed in the preceding pages that the Seven Years' War, which commenced in 1755, owed its origin to the very loose manner in which the boundaries of the French and British possessions in North America had been defined in the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed in 1748. Great Britain was, consequently, (after a peace of only six years duration,) plunged in a new war, which a little prudence, foresight and local information on the part of those who negotiated the peace of Aix-la-

Chapelle, might have prevented. We surely are greatly culpable if we do not avail ourselves of the lessons offered us by the page of history and the experience of our forefathers. The treaty of Ghent was signed at the end of the year 1814. We are now approaching the end of the year 1826. Twelve summers have been allowed to pass away and our boundaries are not yet arranged.

By the treaty of Ghent, three British commissioners were to be appointed to meet three American commissioners to arrange three distinct and separate parts of the frontier between the territory of the United States and His Majesty's North American provinces. The claims of the British and American governments to the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, and that of Grand Menan at the mouth of the Bay of Fundy, were to be referred to one of the commissioners of each nation. The determining the boundary from the point where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the St. Lawrence to the head of the Connecticut River, from thence along the high lands between Canada and the State of Maine to a particular point due north of the source of the St. Croix, and from thence to that source, were to be the objects to be entrusted to a second commissioner from each government. The third commissioners were to arrange the limits of each power from the Lake in

the woods, through Lake Superior, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and down the St. Lawrence to where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river, allotting the several islands and channels as to them should appear just and equitable; and according to the spirit of the former treaty of 1783. It is to that part of the frontier referred to the second commissioners that the observation in the preceding paragraph is meant to apply.

The District of Maine, which is the province of the United States the most interested in the arrangement of this part of the frontier, claims an extension of about 10,000 square miles more than appears to the British commissioner to be just. It does not seem here to be necessary to enter into the arguments brought forward either for or against the right to this additional territory. Commissioners are appointed by solemn treaty and upon oath to determine this frontier. It is understood that the commissioners have not met for now nearly four years, and that their proceedings upon this important point are at a stand. The American commissioner, although aware that the treaty has provided a remedy for any difference of opinion, has not given a statement of his claim and an exposition of the reasons with which he supports them, in order that they may, together with the counter-observations of his colleague, be sub-

mitted to a third power, according to the terms of the treaty; but, apparently unable to baffle his brother commissioner's arguments, has abstained from meeting him altogether, and leaves every thing, of course, unsettled and undefined. That department of the British government which has charge of our diplomacy will, unquestionably, be accused (when the circumstances are before the public) of inattention to the vital interests of His Majesty's North American provinces, if the American government is not called upon to compel their commissioner to resume the performance of his duties; to fix, conjointly with the British commissioner, the limits he has been appointed and sworn to adjust; or, in case of difference of opinion, to state what that difference is; in order that the case may be arranged without delay according to the terms of the treaty of Ghent.

Ten thousand square miles of wild and uncultivated waste in the woods of America may, to many people, appear to be an object hardly worth disputing about. The country, however, in question, if given up to the Americans, would bring them within a few miles of the St. Lawrence, 100 miles below Quebec; would prevent the communication by the St. John's River between Lower Canada, New Brunswick and Halifax; and would conduct an enemy, in time of war, on the back of New Brunswick and on the back of Lower

Canada. If (to remedy the inconvenience of the loss of the communication by the St. John's) it should be decided to have recourse to that proposed more to the eastward, by Ramousky on the St. Lawrence, the Bay des Chaleurs, Miramichi, Dorchester Court-House, and across the peninsula of Nova Scotia, it must be remembered that even this communication, safe and retired while we possess the country between the St. John's and the St. Lawrence, will no longer be so if the Americans should be allowed to hold the upper part of the St. John's and the country within a few miles of the St. Lawrence. All communications from Ramousky to Quebec would then have to pass along the right or south side of the St. Lawrence, under the controul of the Americans in possession of the high ground looking down upon it. The impolicy of not causing the boundary between His Majesty's North American provinces and the United States to be immediately and clearly defined is the more evident the more the subject is considered.

When the French were in possession of Canada they attached, and with reason, the greatest value to the possession of the Island of Cape Breton. From the Port of Louisbourg their cruisers commanded the entrance to the St. Lawrence. Our maritime superiority has prevented, fortunately, the necessity of our incurring the ex-

pense of this additional fortress. It is, however, to be observed, that if the Americans are allowed to occupy the high ground on the south side of the St. Lawrence 100 miles below Quebec, in the course and nature of things they will have access to the river, from which they will only be distant ten or twelve miles. Here, then, will be a new power navigating the St. Lawrence, and a new point of communication offered to any hostile attempt from Europe or from America. The Americans upon the St. Lawrence would necessitate our re-occupying in force and re-fortifying Cape Breton. The evils that would arise from the cession of the territory in question are as sure, and may be predicted with as much certainty, as any future event in human affairs. It is to be hoped and trusted that they will be avoided by a speedy arrangement of the frontier.

HALIFAX CITADEL.

Quebec is not accessible to shipping, and can have no communication with England, excepting through Halifax, for six months of the year. The harbour of Halifax is always open. The mail for Quebec from London is forwarded monthly to Halifax; and from thence up the St. John's River to the St. Lawrence, and so on to Quebec. The necessity of being masters of this communication,

and the importance of Halifax (independently of its own intrinsic value) to the general welfare of the British North American provinces, is, therefore, evident. Halifax in possession of an enemy would impede, if not totally prevent all correspondence with Quebec during the winter. Two regiments and several divisions of seamen were forwarded during the late war from Halifax and New Brunswick to Canada. The distance from St. John's at the mouth of the St. John's River, to Kamarouska on the south side of the St. Lawrence, is only 315 miles. It appears that this communication ought to be improved, and Halifax held securely by means of a citadel.

In addition to the reasons already given for constructing a citadel at Halifax, the protection and security of the very fine dockyard, and large naval establishment, must be remembered. The Americans, at Boston, are only 220 miles from Halifax. The peninsula of Nova Scotia abounds with bays and harbours, at one of which, St. Margaret's Bay, only sixteen miles from Halifax, an American corps might land, and (the coast-batteries and defences being thus taken in the rear) the town, dockyard, and all the public stores and buildings would be liable to be destroyed. In the late war the conquest of Canada was the object of the American government. Baffled in this attempt, and undeceived as to the feelings

and opinions of the Canadians, another war may be carried on with different views. Advantage may be taken of particular circumstances which may require the presence of our troops and of our fleet in some other scene of action, and a very serious blow may be struck at Halifax, where, in consequence, a respectable inclosed work seems particularly required.

It has been observed that, as Halifax has been ours so long without a citadel, the necessity of one being constructed does not immediately appear. This, however, is not strictly the fact. More than four times the expense required for an efficient and permanent work has been expended in building block-houses of wooden logs, surrounded by earthen redoubts. Halifax had a citadel, of this description, in the Seven Years' war. This work was renewed, entirely, in the American war. During the French revolutionary war considerable sums were again expended. In the late American war, Citadel Hill was again occupied. The works are now a heap of ruins. The propriety of occupying that ground well and leisurely, in time of profound peace, which every successive military man has shown his opinion as to the necessity of securing, by actually causing a work of some sort to be constructed upon it, seems so self-evident a proposition, that it is imagined it can hardly be disputed or controverted.

It may not here be deemed irrelative to observe that the New England people (the near neighbours of Nova Scotia) are, by far, the most active, bold, and enterprizing race of any of the inhabitants of the United States. In the preceding pages it will be observed that, so far back as in the year 1745, they fitted out, at Boston, without any communication with England, an expedition against the island of Cape Breton; the cruisers from whence had annoyed their trade. Cape Breton had been very carefully, and at a great expense, fortified by the French, and had a respectable garrison. It was however surrendered to the troops from Boston. The character of the New Englanders ought not to be lost sight of, in addition to the other reasons for the construction of a citadel at Halifax.

If the foregoing reflections are correct, and they are founded upon the most serious consideration of the subject, and the study of every campaign which has been fought on the Canadian frontier, it appears that we only require a very few points to be held to ensure the maintenance of his Majesty's authority in the four British North American provinces against any invasion from the United States. The works to be constructed cannot,

however, be made too complete. They ought to be able to contain every thing within themselves. In the case of our West Indian colonies, our enemy is in Europe; we know of his movements and can follow him. The fortifications and the garrisons in the West Indian Islands need, therefore, only be calculated as sufficient to repress insurrection or to afford protection until reinforced by the disposable force at Barbados, or, at the most, in a few weeks from England. In Canada and at Halifax our enemy is at our door. If our minister at Washington is deceived; if our generals are indolent or supine, a war may be declared and an invasion take place before the ministry in England are aware that hostilities are even contemplated. The construction of the fortresses as proposed becomes consequently the more urgent and indispensable.

The same may be said with respect to the Indians and French. The Americans would willingly acquire both.

THE END. *the others*

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